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  1689 
THE NEED FOR INCREASED POSSIBILITY 
OF DIRECTOR LIABILITY: REFUSAL TO 
DISMISS IN RE WELLS FARGO & CO. 
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE LITIGATION,  
A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION 
Abstract: The frequency and magnitude of corporate scandals call into question 
the effectiveness of the current mechanism to police director misconduct. Pres-
ently, directors are rarely held personally liable for failing to fulfill their fiduciary 
duties. The combination of multiple judicial and statutory protections and the 
courts’ hesitance to impose director liability shields directors and makes it diffi-
cult for shareholder plaintiffs to succeed on such claims. In fact, most claims are 
dismissed before courts have an opportunity to hear the merits of the case. This 
Note focuses on the oversight liability doctrine and argues that it is applied too 
narrowly, at least at the motion to dismiss stage, to deter director misconduct and 
encourage adequate oversight by directors. This Note uses the Wells Fargo corpo-
rate scandal and the directors’ failure of oversight as a case study. In In re Wells 
Fargo & Co. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California denied the director defendants’ motion to 
dismiss, allowing shareholder plaintiffs the opportunity to prove their claims 
against the directors. This Note argues that this rare decision is a positive step 
that sends a firm message to directors that they cannot disregard their duties and 
expect complete protection from liability. 
INTRODUCTION 
In September of 2016, Wells Fargo, the third largest bank in America, 
publicly admitted to creating at least 1.5 million fake bank accounts and issu-
ing 565,000 unauthorized consumer credit cards.1 For these practices, the bank 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Consolidated Amended Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint ¶ 55, at 12, In re Wells 
Fargo & Co. S’holder Derivative Litig., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2017), 2017 WL 1044785; 
Matt Egan, Wells Fargo Victims Get Closer to Payback in $142 Million Settlement, CNN (July 10, 
2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/07/10/investing/wells-fargo-fake-account-settlement/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/QJZ4-84DB] [hereinafter Egan, $142 Million Settlement]; Lisa Joyce, Can Wells Far-
go’s Brand Survive Another Scandal?, FIN. BRAND (Sept. 12, 2007), https://thefinancialbrand.com/
67399/wells-fargo-brand-scandal-crisis [https://perma.cc/SL3V-XF92]; see Matt Egan, 5,300 Wells 
Fargo Employees Fired over 2 Million Phony Accounts, CNN MONEY (Sept. 9, 2016), http:// money. 
cnn.com/2016/09/08/investing/wells-fargo-created-phony-accounts-bank-fees/index.html [https:// perma. 
cc/EK65-PX2J] [hereinafter Egan, 2 Million Phony Accounts] (describing the harm that Wells Fargo 
caused its customers and reporting that in a statement to the public, Wells Fargo took responsibility for 
the unwanted and unauthorized products). Wells Fargo is the “third largest bank in the United States by 
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was fined $185 million.2 Additionally, in April of 2017, Wells Fargo agreed to 
settle a national class action suit against them for $142 million to compensate 
affected customers.3 Wells Fargo had charged customers about $2.6 million in 
fines and fees for those unwanted accounts and credit cards.4 At least between 
2011 and 2015, Wells Fargo’s demanding corporate culture and sales practices 
pushed employees to open these fake accounts without customer authorization 
in order to meet high sales quotas.5 In fact, there is evidence that these practic-
es reached as far back as 2002, and possibly even earlier.6 The Wells Fargo 
Board of Directors (“the Board”) received consistent warning signs, or “red 
                                                                                                                           
assets” and the second largest in the world by “market capitalization.” Complaint, In re Wells Fargo 
& Co. S’holder Derivative Litig., supra, ¶ 69, at 14. 
 2 Bill Chappell, Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million Over Creation of Fake Accounts for Bonuses, 
NPR (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/09/08/493130449/wells-fargo-
to-pay-around-190-million-over-fake-accounts-that-sparked-bonuses [https://perma.cc/B46R-JHV6]. 
The $185 million fine is made up of three separate fines. Id. Wells Fargo will pay $50 million to the 
City and County of Los Angeles and $35 million to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC). Id.; see Proposed Stipulated Final Judgment ¶ 40, at 11, California v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 
BC580778 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 2016) (judgment of $50 million in civil penalties approved). The 
remaining $100 million will be paid to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0015, at 17 (Sept. 8, 2017), https://files.consumerfinance.
gov/f/documents/092016_cfpb_WFBconsentorder.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7NT-J968]; Chappell, su-
pra. 
 3 Egan, $142 Million Settlement, supra note 1. The initial settlement was for $110 million; how-
ever, the settlement was increased to include customers who were affected by the fake bank accounts 
as far back as 2002. Id. The attorney’s fees and other administrative costs will be the first expenses 
paid from the settlement, followed by “out-of-pocket losses” that customers suffered. Id. If what is left 
after these expenses are paid is less than $25 million, Wells Fargo has agreed to increase the settle-
ment. Id. The remaining pool of money will be split between the customers depending on the type of 
account that was opened under their name, how many accounts were opened under their name, and 
how much of a financial loss they suffered. Id. 
 4 See Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶ 55, at 12 (explaining that, of the fake 
accounts and unauthorized credit cards opened, about 115,000 of these accounts collectively produced 
about $2.6 million in fees). 
 5 See INDEP. DIRS. OF THE BOARD OF WELLS FARGO & CO., SALES PRACTICE INVESTIGATION 
REPORT 4 (2017) [hereinafter BOARD INVESTIGATION REPORT], https://www08.wellsfargomedia.
com/assets/pdf/about/investor-relations/presentations/2017/board-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/VV2Z-
WCTT] (finding that strong culture and improper sales models led to an atmosphere that prompted 
“low quality sales” and “unethical behavior”); Egan, $142 Million Settlement, supra note 1 (stating 
that Wells Fargo admitted to illegal activity between 2011 and 2015); infra notes 127–128 and ac-
companying text. 
 6 See Matt Egan, Wells Fargo Scandal: Where Was the Board?, CNN (Apr. 24, 2017), 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/04/24/investing/wells-fargo-scandal-board-annual-meeting/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/454R-2S74] [hereinafter Egan, Where Was the Board?] (reporting that the Wells 
Fargo Board had knowledge of sales violations though audit reports and examinations dating back to 
2002, which they ignored); DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF THE COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., U.S. HOUSE OF REP-
RESENTATIVES, THE CASE FOR HOLDING MEGABANKS ACCOUNTABLE: AN EXAMINATION OF WELLS 
FARGO’S EGREGIOUS CONSUMER ABUSES 6 n.7, (2017), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploaded
files/09.29.17_staff_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/BD47-QZTK] (stating that it is estimated that 
Wells Fargo and its subsidiaries have paid more than eleven billion dollars in fines for various kinds 
of violations since 2000). 
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flags,” of such practices as early as 2005, but failed to act, allowing the fraud 
to escalate.7 
On February 24, 2017, Wells Fargo shareholders filed a shareholder de-
rivative law suit, naming the bank itself, executive officers, and directors as 
defendants.8 The complaint alleged that defendants encouraged illegal practic-
es by enforcing a competitive sales strategy and that defendants either were 
aware of or “consciously disregarded” the creation of unauthorized bank ac-
counts by employees.9 Plaintiffs alleged that directors failed to act in the 
bank’s best interest and are therefore liable for violations of multiple provi-
sions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, violations of state law, and 
breach of their fiduciary duties.10 
Wells Fargo is one of a series of corporate scandals, in which directors 
and officers failed to adequately address widespread illegalities within the cor-
                                                                                                                           
 7 See Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶ 21, at 7 (alleging that directors “turned 
a blind eye” to red flags regarding illegal activity as early as 2007); Egan, Where Was the Board?, 
supra note 6 (“Wells Fargo’s board of directors received ‘regular’ reports since 2005 warning that 
most of the bank's internal ethics hotline complaints and firings were linked to sales violations.”); 
infra notes 146–161 and accompanying text. 
 8 See Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶¶ 66–91, at 14–17 (naming all of the 
defendants who are subject to litigation). This Note focuses solely on the director defendants, who 
include: John G. Stumpf, John D. Baker II, Elaine L. Chao, John S. Chen, Lloyd H. Dean, Elizabeth 
A. Duke, Susan E. Engel, Enrique Hernandez, Donald M. James, Cynthia H. Milligan, Enrique Peña, 
James H. Quigley, Judith M. Runstad, Steven W. Sanger, Susan G. Swenson, and Suzanne M. Vautri-
not. Id. ¶¶ 76–91, at 15–17. Timothy J. Sloan is listed as an officer defendant. Id. at 15. Shareholder 
derivative actions are suits brought by shareholders against directors or officers of a corporation alleg-
ing that they have caused harm to the company. WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COM-
MENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 375 (5th ed. 2016). These actions 
allow shareholders to remedy harm or loss to the company on behalf of the corporation, specifically in 
situations where the company itself cannot or will not bring the lawsuit. WENJING CHEN, A COMPAR-
ATIVE STUDY OF FUNDING SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 17 (2017). An example of this situation is 
when the company is controlled by the directors and officers who are causing the harm to the compa-
ny. Id. 
 9 Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶ 1, at 4; see infra notes 122–123 and ac-
companying text. 
 10 Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶ 56, at 12. The Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 governs the buying and selling of securities. See John E. Tracy & Alfred Brunson MacChesney, 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1025, 1025 (1934) (explaining that the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 regulates stock exchanges). Additionally, the Act created the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and gave it broad authority to regulate and oversee the securities indus-
try. The Law That Governs the Securities Industry, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-law
sshtml.html [https://perma.cc/ES8N-QZE2]. Plaintiffs in the Wells Fargo suit asserted eleven causes 
of action: “(1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) breach of fiduciary duty for insider 
selling and misappropriation of information; (4) violation of § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act 
and SEC Rule 14a-9; (5) violations of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5; 
(6) violation of § 20A of the Securities Exchange Act; (7) violations of § 29(b) of the Securities ex-
change act; (8) violation of § 25402 of the California Corporations Code; (9) violation of § 25403 of 
the California Corporations Code; (10) corporate waste; and (11) contribution and indemnification.” 
In re Wells Fargo & Co., 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1088 (summarizing the eleven causes of action that plain-
tiffs brought against defendants). 
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poration and failed to perform their required duties.11 Conscious disregard of 
their duties by directors and officers affects not only the company itself, but 
also its consumers and potentially the larger economy.12 The magnitude and 
reoccurrence of these types of scandals brings into question the effectiveness 
of judicial approaches to corporate governance, suggesting that there is no 
good mechanism to effectively police director misconduct.13 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See infra notes 162–176 and accompanying text. Two examples, among many, of other corpo-
rate scandals are those surrounding Enron and Equifax. See Sean Farrell, The World’s Biggest Ac-
counting Scandals, THE GUARDIAN (July 21, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/
jul/21/the-worlds-biggest-accounting-scandals-toshiba-enron-olympus [https://perma.cc/W4WC-
X4QD] (stating that the scandal at Enron was one of the largest accounting scandals); Hamza Shaban, 
Equifax CEO Richard Smith Steps Down Amid Hacking Scandal, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/09/26/equifax-ceo-retires-following-
massive-data-breach [https://perma.cc/J4PX-BNCE] (describing the Equifax scandal). Enron was a 
company that traded energy. See MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21135, THE ENRON 
COLLAPSE: AN OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL ISSUES 2 (2003) https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/
20040812_RS21135_d3ccc53ec06a45476370a0cd5255b99c69afea08.pdf [https://perma.cc/BU3J-
ELRZ] (describing Enron’s energy-trading business). The company made a series of bad investments 
that affected the financial condition of the company but hid the losses by falsifying its accounts in-
stead of disclosing the situation to investors. Id. The losses were kept secret for about eighteen 
months, and when disclosed, the company quickly collapsed. Id. Similarly, Equifax is a “consumer 
credit reporting agency” that holds important consumer personal and financial information. How Does 
Credit Reporting Work?, EQUIFAX, https://help.equifax.com/s/article/How-does-credit-reporting-work 
[https://perma.cc/Q3G9-WSWU]; Consumer Reporting Agency, INVESTORWORDS, http://www.
investorwords.com/1063/consumer_reporting_agency.html [https://perma.cc/Q47N-8R3F]. On Septem-
ber 7, 2017, Equifax announced that its database had been breached by hackers between May and July of 
2017. See Elizabeth Weise, A Timeline of Events Surrounding the Equifax Data Breach, USA TODAY 
(Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/09/26/timeline-events-surrounding-
equifax-data-breach/703691001/ [https://perma.cc/F2P9-REF4] (describing the timeline of events of 
the Equifax scandal). This breach resulted in the hackers gaining access to confidential information 
belonging to 44% of the people of United States. Id. There is evidence that Equifax’s CEO, Richard 
Smith, knew about the breach for weeks before informing the board of directors. Liz Moyer, Equifax’s 
Then-CEO Waited Three Weeks to Inform Board of Massive Data Breach, Testimony Says, CNBC 
(Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/02/equifaxs-then-ceo-waited-three-weeks-to-inform-
board-of-massive-data-breach-testimony-says.html [https://perma.cc/W43S-FFME]. 
 12 See infra notes 190–199 and accompanying text. Wells Fargo caused its customers significant 
financial losses. See Complaint ¶ 6, at 3, California v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. BC580778 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. May 4, 2015) (alleging that Wells Fargo has: “(a) withdrawn money from customers’ authorized 
accounts to pay for the fees assess by Wells Fargo on unauthorized accounts opened in customers’ 
names; (b) placed customers into collections when the unauthorized withdrawals from customer ac-
counts went unpaid; (c) placed derogatory information in credit reports when unauthorized fees went 
unpaid; (d) denied customers access to their funds while Wells Fargo stockpiled account applications; 
and (e) caused customers to purchase identity theft protection”). Financial losses to one company 
caused by these corporate scandals increase systemic risk—the threat of financial distress at one fi-
nancial institution may lead to distress at other financial institutions. See infra notes 194–197 and 
accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 17–19, 181–184 and accompanying text. Statutory approaches have perhaps 
been equally ineffective at policing director misconduct. See CHEN, supra note 8, at 30 (acknowledg-
ing that statutory rules on shareholder litigation are not necessarily effective); JICKLING, supra note 11 
(stating that the collapse of large corporations such as Enron after corporate scandals suggests that 
there are weaknesses in the United States’ current system of securities regulation). 
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Directors are bound by the oversight liability doctrine to, in good faith, at-
tempt to implement and maintain an appropriate reporting or monitoring sys-
tem.14 Under this doctrine, directors are liable to their company when they fail 
to perform these duties up to a certain standard.15 This Note argues that the 
judicial application of this doctrine is too narrow, at least at the motion to dis-
miss stage, and does not increase the risk of director liability adequately to de-
ter bad behavior.16 The reality is that directors are rarely held personally liable 
for their actions (or inactions).17 Liability is usually only triggered in extreme 
circumstances.18 In addition, directors almost never pay out of pocket for any 
type of litigation or settlement.19 Reform of state corporate law and judicial 
                                                                                                                           
 14 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996); see infra notes 
46–61 and accompanying text. 
 15 In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 (requiring directors to have and adequately oversee a moni-
toring system for detecting misconduct); see infra notes 46–61 (discussing the Caremark ruling and 
standard). 
 16 See infra notes 17–20, 76–120, 181–184, and accompanying text. Because Wells Fargo is in-
corporated in Delaware, as are many large corporations, this Note will only focus on Delaware corpo-
rate law and case law. Leslie Wayne, How Delaware Thrives as a Corporate Tax Haven, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 30, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/business/how-delaware-thrives-as-a-corporate-
tax-haven.html [https://perma.cc/9538-M25J]; see Wells Fargo & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 
(Feb. 28, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72971/000119312512084528/d280360
d10k.htm [https://perma.cc/MS47-Z4L8]. Additionally, the majority of the cases regarding oversight 
liability claims are not decided on the merits because they are dismissed for failure to meet the de-
mand requirements. Martin Petrin, Assessing Delaware’s Oversight Jurisprudence: A Policy and 
Theory Perspective, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 433, 452 n.93 (2011); see infra notes 99–100 (explaining 
the pre-litigation demand requirement that plaintiffs must meet before they can continue with their 
shareholder derivative action). This fact, however, does not impair the court’s ability to set the stand-
ard and requirements for oversight liability, because a successful oversight liability claim would satis-
fy the demand requirement. Petrin, supra, at 452 n.93; see infra notes 99–100.  
 17 See Gretchen Morgenson, Sending Wells Fargo a Word of Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2017, 
at BU1 (explaining that directors have protections against most legal liability). 
 18 Brad S. Karp, Analysis of Wells Fargo Shareholder Litigation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Dec. 15, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/12/15/analysis-
of-wells-fargo-shareholder-litigation [https://perma.cc/6WWW-S9M9]; see Julian Velasco, Fiduciary 
Duties and Fiduciary Outs, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 157, 166–67 (2013) (acknowledging that direc-
tor liability will be found only for “egregious breaches” of any fiduciary duty). 
 19 See ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 8, at 422 (discussing the findings of a study on hundreds 
of shareholder suits, specifically that: in most of the cases settled, director and officer (D&O) insur-
ance covered the majority of the settlement amount, and directors and officers never paid costs or 
expenses themselves). Both parties in shareholder suits have incentives to settle. Id. at 421. Pursuing a 
lawsuit is very expensive for plaintiffs, especially through discovery, and they risk losing all of the 
suit costs. Id. Regarding defendant directors, corporate statutes allow for indemnification, which au-
thorizes the corporation to reimburse the director (or agent, employee, or officer) for reasonable ex-
penses arising from a judicial proceeding including settlement payments (subject to certain limita-
tions). DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2018); ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 8, at 421. Directors 
are incentivized to settle because if the case is fully litigated, they can only be indemnified by court 
authorization. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 8, at 421. Additionally, directors have the protection 
of D&O insurance, which will cover the expenses and penalties from such litigation or settlement, so 
paying a settlement does not cost them money. Id. Losses that arise from fraud or self-dealing are 
typically excluded from D&O insurance if the case is litigated, while settlement allows this insurance 
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standards, specifically broadening the application of the oversight liability doc-
trine would send a stronger message to directors regarding the consequences of 
their decisions and hopefully prevent future scandals.20 
This Note illustrates the tremendous obstacles that shareholder plaintiffs 
must overcome to be successful in lawsuits against directors or officers of a 
corporation under the current application of the oversight liability doctrine by 
the courts.21 This Note examines In re Wells Fargo & Co. Shareholder Deriva-
tive Litigation and the Wells Fargo scandal as a whole to demonstrate how the 
current corporate governance system is lacking and show the importance of 
judicial reformation of the oversight liability doctrine.22 Part I describes the 
evolution and current standard of the doctrine through case law and explains 
two important director protections from liability.23 Part II discusses why it is so 
difficult to hold directors liable for breach of their fiduciary duties and consid-
ers the narrow interpretation of the oversight liability doctrine.24 Part III focus-
es solely on Wells Fargo, the series of events that led to the creation of fake 
bank accounts, the red flags that repeatedly gave the directors warning of the 
fraudulent activity, and the directors’ conscious disregard for their duty of 
oversight.25 Finally, Part IV analyzes why it is important to the larger economy 
to broaden the application of director liability and provides judicial reforms 
that could move the courts in the right direction.26 
I. OVERSIGHT LIABILITY DOCTRINE AND DIRECTOR PROTECTIONS 
Corporations are required to be managed by a board of directors.27 The 
relationship between a board of directors, the corporation, and its shareholders 
                                                                                                                           
to cover the losses. Id. All corporations have D&O insurance policies, which are usually divided into 
two parts: (1) coverage to the corporation for the defense and indemnification of its officers and direc-
tors; and (2) coverage to directors and officers for situations where the indemnification is inapplicable. 
Id. at 422. 
 20 See Morgenson, supra note 17 (explaining that the U.S. District Court in San Francisco’s deni-
al of the director defendants’ motion to dismiss in In re Wells Fargo & Co. S’holder Derivative Litig. 
sent a strong message to directors of “be vigilant for bad behavior in your operations, or else”); infra 
notes 180, 200–216, and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 40–120 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 121–199 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 27–75 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 76–120 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 121–176 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 177–217 and accompanying text. 
 27 Lisa M. Fairfax, Government Governance and the Need to Reconcile Government Regulation 
with Board Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1692, 1692–93 (2011); see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 141(a). Board members, also called directors, are appointed or elected by the corporation’s share-
holders. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 8, at 163. Shareholders of a corporation have an ownership 
interest in the company, received in exchange for providing the company with capital. Roles of Share-
holders and Directors, VENTURE CHOICE, http://www.venturechoice.com/articles/roles_of_share
holders_and_directors.htm [https://perma.cc/Q9KG-QH67]. This ownership share gives shareholders 
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is a fiduciary one, which imposes certain duties upon directors.28 Suing for 
breach of these duties is the shareholders’ primary tool to supervise and control 
directors and officers of a corporation, because such breach can lead to the im-
position of personal liability on the directors.29 The Delaware courts have de-
fined three core fiduciary duties: the duty of care, the duty of loyalty, and the 
duty of good faith.30 
The duty of care requires that directors make fully informed decisions 
with the level of care that an “ordinarily careful and prudent” person would use 
in a similar situation and under similar circumstances.31 The standard of re-
view for breach of the duty of care is a finding of gross negligence.32 Regard-
                                                                                                                           
the right to vote, the right to sue, and the right to sell their shares. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 
8, at 163. Although shareholders have these rights, they generally have no involvement in the man-
agement of the company. Roles of Shareholders and Directors, supra. Directors appoint officers to 
manage the business of the company and its “day-to-day operations,” but monitor and supervise the 
officers’ actions, as well as participate in the major decisions of the corporation. LATHAM & WATKINS 
LLP, AN OVERVIEW OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES 3 (2016), https://www.lw.com/admin/Upload/Documents/
OilAndGasMandA/Governance/An_Overview_of_Fiduciary_Duties.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BGE-
ZQC2]; FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Westlaw Practical Law Practice Note 6-
382-1267 (2015). Within a corporation, the board of directors is said to have an “advisory or supervi-
sory role.” FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, supra. 
 28 Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239, 244, 258 (2009). 
A fiduciary is a person who has the responsibility to act for the benefit of another. Fiduciary, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 29 Alces, supra note 28, at 243. The threat of litigation can deter bad behavior. Id. 
 30 Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001); see In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative 
Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 745 (Del. Ch. 2005) (creating and announcing a duty of good faith for directors). 
 31 Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the Business Judgment Rule: Reflections on 
Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV. 398, 406 (2007); see Ivanhoe Partners 
v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987) (stating that the duty of care requires 
directors to act “in an informed and deliberate manner respecting the corporate merits of an issue 
before the board”); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985) (explaining that direc-
tors have a duty to make “informed business judgment[s]” under the duty of care); Graham v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. Ch. 1963) (explaining that when managing affairs of the 
corporation, directors must act with care in the way that an “ordinarily careful and prudent” person 
would in a similar situation). The duty of care is centered around the process by which directors make 
decisions for the company, not the substance of the final decision itself. Alces, supra note 28, at 251; 
see Anne Tucker Nees, Who’s the Boss—Unmasking Oversight Liability Within the Corporate Power 
Puzzle, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 208–09 (2010) (stating that whether a director acted in compliance 
with the duty of care is a procedural question which looks at the information that the directors consid-
ered when making a decision and whether they considered alternatives and consequences of the deci-
sion). 
 32 See Velasco, supra note 18, at 167 (explaining that although the standard of conduct for direc-
tors is a negligence standard, the courts will only find liability for breach of duty of care if there is 
proof of gross negligence). Standards of conduct are the rules that actors must follow when operating 
in a specific environment. Id. at 166. Standards of review are the criteria that judges apply when ruling 
on a particular issue. Id. A person negligently breaches a duty when (1) they behave differently than a 
reasonable person would in similar circumstances and (2) the breach causes harm. Negligence, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Gross negligence is an extreme degree of negligence that 
is characterized by reckless disregard of one’s duty to act like a reasonable prudent person. Gross 
Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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ing the duties of loyalty and good faith, the latter is a subset of the former.33 
Under the duty of loyalty, directors must always, in good faith, act with and for 
the best interest of the company rather than for their own self-interest.34 Good 
faith prohibits directors from acting in bad faith, which is acting with the intent 
to harm or to knowingly disregard their duties to the corporation.35 Therefore, 
the standard of review for breach of the duty of loyalty requires knowingly 
acting against the best interest of the corporation.36 
Claims brought for oversight failure can be brought under breach of the 
duty of care or the duty of loyalty, however the imposition of liability is lim-
ited by the business judgment rule and Delaware General Corporation Law 
(DGCL) section 102(b)(7).37 Section A explains the oversight liability doc-
trine, its creation, and the evolution of the standard for finding liability.38 Sec-
tion B defines the business judgment rule and DGCL section 102(b)(7).39 
A. Origins of Oversight Liability and Standards for  
Finding Director Liability 
The oversight liability doctrine evolved through case law, being first di-
rectly addressed in 1963.40 In Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 
employees of the electrical equipment manufacturer Allis-Chalmers violated 
                                                                                                                           
 33 See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (establishing that the duty of good faith 
is a condition or a requirement of the duty of loyalty). Courts previously viewed the duty of good faith 
as its own fiduciary duty, but have recently consolidated it with the duty of loyalty. See Petrin, supra 
note 16, at 446 (describing how the Stone court ended the “triad” of fiduciary duties). 
 34 See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (stating that directors are prohibited from 
using their power within the company to make decisions that further their own personal interests). 
Directors have a positive duty to protect corporate interests and a negative duty to not harm the com-
pany. Id. This demands that a director have “unselfish loyalty” to their corporation. Id. 
 35 Nees, supra note 31, at 209. 
 36 See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (establishing that “[w]here directors fail to act in the face of a 
known duty to act, thereby demonstrating a conscious disregard for their responsibilities, they breach 
their duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in good faith”). 
 37 See Nees, supra note 31, at 215–16 (arguing that, although claims for oversight liability can be 
brought as breaches of the duty of care, loyalty, or good faith, obstacles such as exculpatory provi-
sions, the business judgment rule, and the merger of the duty of good faith into the duty of loyalty 
have restricted the imposition of liability and it is actually a “toothless tiger” for directors); infra notes 
62–75, 86–102 and accompanying text; see, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 
at 960 (bringing an oversight claim based on an alleged breach of the duty of care); Complaint, In re 
Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶ 526, at 112 (alleging that directors breached their duties of loyalty 
and good faith). 
 38 See infra notes 40–61 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 62–75 and accompanying text. 
 40 See Petrin, supra note 16, at 439 (stating that the court had not addressed the issue of whether 
maintaining a proper reporting system is part of the fiduciary duties that directors owe the corporation 
and its shareholders until Graham); infra notes 41–61 and accompanying text. See generally Graham, 
188 A.2d at 130 (addressing plaintiffs’ allegation that liability should be imposed on directors who 
caused loss to the corporation by their failure to manage the affairs of the corporation). 
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anti-trust laws, causing significant losses to the company.41 Plaintiffs alleged 
that the directors of the corporation should have implemented a monitoring 
system, which would have alerted them to the misconduct by their employ-
ees.42 Consequently, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
whether directors are required to implement adequate reporting systems or in-
ternal controls to prevent illegal activity without any prior cause for suspi-
cion.43 In declining to impose liability, the court held that directors are only 
required to implement such a monitoring system when something occurs to 
indicate illegal activity, but that prior to such an event, directors cannot be held 
liable for failing to have such a system.44 This was the birth of the “red flag” 
doctrine, the “red flag” referring to a warning sign of illegalities, which trig-
gers director liability.45 
In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation expanded the 
concept of oversight liability and established the standard for finding such lia-
bility.46 Caremark International was a health care provider whose employees 
violated the Anti-Referral Payments Law, resulting in both civil and criminal 
penalties for the corporation.47 Plaintiffs brought an oversight claim, arguing 
that directors breached their duty of care and attention by allowing the viola-
                                                                                                                           
 41 Graham, 188 A.2d at 127. The employees illegally fixed prices and falsified bids to private 
electric utility and governmental agencies. Id. at 128. There are three main federal anti-trust laws still 
in effect today: the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Clayton Act. The Anti-
Trust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-
antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/3RLC-AJ5X]. In general, these laws prohibit unlawful 
or unfair business practices, giving deference to the court in deciding which acts are specifically ille-
gal. Id. 
 42 Graham, 188 A.2d at 130. Plaintiffs initially alleged that directors had knowledge of the feder-
al violations or that they should have known of such violations, based on knowledge of certain facts 
that would have put them on notice. Id. at 127. The court determined that there was no evidence that 
directors had knowledge of the illegal activity or had reason to be suspicious of such violations, leav-
ing the plaintiffs with the latter argument. Id. at 129–30. 
 43 See id. at 130 (addressing the plaintiffs’ argument that the directors should have implemented a 
monitoring system to bring violations to their attention). 
 44 See id. at 130–31 (stating that directors can rely on their managers’, officers’, and employees’ 
honesty and that no duty to further investigate arises until the directors are given a reason to no longer 
rely on that honesty). The court considered the size of the company, noting that the directors could not 
possibly know all the employees on a personal level. Id. at 130. 
 45 See Graham, 188 A.2d at 130 (establishing that an event that gives notice to directors of mis-
conduct by employees followed by director inaction could lead to the imposition of liability); Petrin, 
supra note 16, at 439–40 (explaining how Graham established the “red flag” doctrine). The court held 
that the whether liability will be imposed on a director for losses due to failure to perform a duty will 
be determined by the circumstances. Graham, 188 A.2d at 130. For example, directors will be held 
liable if they recklessly confide in an employee who is clearly untrustworthy, refuse to perform their 
duties, or ignore obvious warning signs (“red flags”) of misconduct. Id. 
 46 In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971; see infra notes 47–51 and accompanying text. 
 47 See In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 960–62 (explaining that the employees allegedly violated a 
law that bars health care providers from paying “to induce the referral of Medicare or Medicaid pa-
tients,” leading to significant negative consequences to the company). 
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tions to occur and continue, which led to significant losses for the company.48 
Although the court dismissed the derivative case brought against the directors, 
the court established that directors must, in good faith, attempt to implement 
an adequate reporting system or internal controls even in the absence of red 
flags, and failure to do so may lead to liability.49 The standard for finding lia-
bility for this breach of a good faith duty to implement adequate reporting sys-
tems is only met by a “sustained or systematic failure of oversight” by the 
board.50 “Utter failure” to establish such systems is necessary to show lack of 
good faith and impose liability, according to the court.51 
In Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court further clarified the stand-
ard of the duty of oversight, combining the standards in Graham and Care-
mark.52 In Stone, AmSouth employees violated federal anti-money laundering 
regulations, causing the corporation financial loss.53 In bringing a derivative 
lawsuit against directors, plaintiff shareholders alleged a “classic Caremark 
claim”—that the board failed to, in good faith, implement an adequate moni-
                                                                                                                           
 48 Id. at 967. The violations caused the company a loss of about $250 million. Id. at 960. 
 49 Id. at 970–71. The court rejected Graham and held that directors do not satisfy their obligation 
to be reasonably informed without ensuring that there is a system in place to inform them. Id. at 970. 
Nevertheless, the court conceded that directors’ duty of good faith to be reasonably informed does not 
require them to collect comprehensive information on every aspect of the corporation. Id. at 971. 
Moreover, the court distinguished between two ways to claim breach of the duty of oversight. Id. at 
967. The first way is to claim that losses occurred due to a negligent board decision. Id. The second 
arises from an “unconsidered failure of the board to act” in situations where the corporation would not 
have suffered the harm that it did if the board had acted. Id. When plaintiffs allege the latter, it is 
known as a Caremark claim and is subject to the standard laid out by the Caremark court for over-
sight liability. See, e.g., Stone, 911 A.2d at 364 (stating that plaintiffs alleged a Caremark claim). 
 50 In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. Caremark International’s incentive system encouraged kick-
back payments; however, even though the directors were benefiting, the court still ruled in their favor. 
Regina F. Burch, Director Oversight and Monitoring: The Standard of Care and the Standard of Lia-
bility Post-Enron, 6 WYO. L. REV. 481, 494 (2006). 
 51 In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. The court acknowledged that this is an extremely difficult 
standard of liability to meet; however, a more demanding liability standard might be beneficial to 
shareholders. Id. A less demanding standard may limit the pool of qualified applicants for board posi-
tions because of fear of liability. Id. Additionally, Delaware courts have acknowledged that holding 
directors liable would “cripple their ability to earn returns for investors by taking business risks.” In re 
Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 109, 126 (Del. Ch. 2009). Caremark established 
three requirements that are necessary to show that directors breached their duty of care when they 
failed to control and monitor their employees: plaintiffs must (1) show that directors had knowledge 
of the misconduct or should have known that misconduct was occurring; (2) show failure by the direc-
tors to make a good faith attempt to prevent future misconduct or fix the current situation; and (3) 
show that the failure by the directors resulted in loss to the company. 698 A.2d at 971. 
 52 See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (incorporating both Graham’s red flag doctrine and the duty to 
implement a system of reporting or monitoring from Caremark); see also In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 
970–71 (setting the standard for finding liability under the oversight doctrine). 
 53 Stone, 911 A.2d at 365. AmSouth is incorporated in Delaware and had a bank as a subsidiary. 
Id. The employees violated the anti-money-laundering laws by failing to file Suspicious Activity Re-
ports, which are required by law. Id. Such violations resulted in fines and penalties of about $50 mil-
lion. Id. 
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toring system that would have alerted them of such violations.54 The court, 
however, reaffirmed the Chancery Court’s decision to dismiss the case because 
of evidence that the directors had exercised oversight by having reasonable re-
porting systems in place and taking steps to ensure compliance with the law.55 
The Delaware Supreme Court clarified the two situations in which direc-
tors can be held liable under Caremark claims: (1) where directors completely 
fail to implement a monitoring system; or (2) where directors, with such a sys-
tem in place, “consciously fail[] to monitor or oversee its operations thus disa-
bling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their at-
tention.”56 Both of these standards require directors to have knowledge of their 
own failure to fulfill their duties, which is a breach of the duty of good faith.57 
The Stone court took it one step further and established that a failure to act in 
good faith is a violation of directors’ duty of loyalty.58 
Together, these cases established the standard that the courts rely on in 
determining board member liability for breach of their oversight duty.59 In 
summary, under the oversight liability doctrine, directors can be held liable for 
breach of this duty when they: (1) knowingly fail to put a monitoring system 
into place to monitor and oversee behavior of employees, (2) knowingly fail to 
oversee the operation of such a program or to take steps to ensure it continues 
to be effective, or (3) knowingly fail to investigate after they were put on no-
                                                                                                                           
 54 Id. at 364, 370. The plaintiffs did not allege that the directors had knowledge of or should have 
had knowledge of the violations. Id. at. 364. 
 55 See id. at 372–73 (relying on a report that showed that directors established a reporting system, 
approved additional policies and procedures, and oversaw periodic monitoring of employees to ensure 
that employees were acting in compliance with the laws). The court noted that the plaintiffs failed to 
recognize that a good faith attempt by directors to fulfill their oversight responsibilities may not al-
ways prevent employees from engaging in activities that are illegal or that cause the corporation fi-
nancial loss. Id. at 373. 
 56 Id. at 370. The court clarified that when there are no red flags, the only way that the duty of 
good faith can be breached is by failing to make sure that there is an adequate information system in 
place. See id. at 373 (quoting In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967–68, 971). 
 57 See id. at 370 (establishing that “when directors fail to act in the face of a known duty to act, 
thereby demonstrating a conscious disregard for their responsibilities, they breach their duty of loyalty 
by failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in good faith”). 
 58 Id. The court established that breach of the duty of good faith alone cannot result in liability. Id. 
Only breaches of the duties of care and loyalty can result in director liability. Id. The duty of loyalty 
encompasses the duty of good faith. Id. 
 59 See id. (clarifying the standard for finding oversight liability by combining Graham’s “red 
flag” doctrine and Caremark’s standard of the good faith requirement); In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 
971 (setting the standard for oversight liability); Graham, 188 A.2d at 130 (establishing the “red flag” 
doctrine”); see, e.g., Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 939–40 (Del. 2007) (relying on the Care-
mark and Stone standard to determine whether the court should impose oversight liability on defend-
ant directors); In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 123–24 (analyzing the plaintiffs’ Caremark claim). 
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tice by red flags, either actual or constructive.60 All of these avenues for liabil-
ity require a conscious disregard of their duties.61 
B. Director Protections: The Business Judgment Rule  
and DGCL Section 102(b)(7) 
Both the business judgment rule and DGCL section 102(b)(7) provide 
limitations on board member liability for breach of their fiduciary duties.62 The 
business judgment rule is a judicially created protection which balances direc-
tors’ fiduciary duties with their right to make decisions for their company.63 
Under this rule, when a decision by directors is questioned, the reviewing court 
will presume that the directors “acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in 
honest belief that the action was in the best interest of the company,” unless 
shown otherwise.64 The presumption allows directors and managers to appropri-
ately engage in risky transactions without exposure to liability if those transac-
tions or activities fail.65 Because this rule revolves around the decision-making 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Jeremy S. Piccini, Director Liability, the Duty of Oversight, and the Need to Investigate, 2011 
BUS. L. TODAY 1, 2. At a minimum, in addition to implementing a monitoring system, directors must 
act in good faith to address violations of the law when they have direct knowledge of illegalities or 
knowledge of red flags. Id. Examples of red flags that put the directors on notice are: whistleblower 
complaints, letters or public notices, public suspicion, consumer complaints, related civil litigation 
claims, and other issues discovered by internal controls. Id. Whistleblowers are employees of a com-
pany who go above their superiors in order to address and bring out an issue or problem. Whistleblow-
er, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 61 Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
 62 See infra notes 63–75 and accompanying text. 
 63 James L. Griffith, Director Oversight Liability: Twenty-First Century Standards and Legisla-
tive Controls on Liability, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 653, 658–59 (1995); see Aronson v. Lewis, 437 A.2d 
805, 812 (Del. 1984) (stating the current interpretation of the business judgment rule); Zapata Corp. v. 
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779,782 (Del. 1981) (acknowledging that the business judgment rule protects 
the decisions that directors make on behalf of the corporation and their managerial powers under 
DGCL section 141(a)). DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a). Although the business judgment rule is a 
common-law rule, many state legislatures have codified the principles underlying this presumption. 
See Linsday C. Llewellyn, Breaking Down the Business Judgment Rule, 14 COM. & BUS. LITIG. 1, 2 
(2013) (providing CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) as an example of a state statute that codifies the under-
lying principles of the business judgment rule). 
 64 Aronson, 437 A.2d at 812. The business judgment rule only applies to directors who are disin-
terested, as opposed to interested. Id. An interested director is one who appears to be on both sides of 
a transaction, is involved in self-dealing, or gains personal benefit from the transaction at the expense 
of the corporation. Id. 
 65 In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 125. Courts have recognized that they are not in the best position 
to “second-guess” decisions made by directors. Griffith, supra note 63, at 655; FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF 
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, supra note 27. The business judgment rule discourages courts from hind-
sight evaluation of director decisions and from second-guessing the quality of those decisions. In re 
Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 126. This avoidance of second-guessing decisions is a fundamental, well-
established principle of Delaware fiduciary law. Id. 
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process, it is mostly connected to the duty of care and the concept of gross 
negligence.66 
The plaintiff shareholders have the burden of overcoming and rebutting 
the business judgment presumption.67 To overcome this presumption, plaintiffs 
must show: (1) a conflict of interest (sometimes termed an “interested direc-
tor”); (2) a failure to act in good faith; (3) a failure to exercise due care by not 
becoming fully informed when making decisions; (4) the absence of a rational 
business purpose for a decision or the abuse of discretion; or (5) the lack of a 
business decision (in other words, inaction because of inattention).68 
Another widespread tool that directors use to escape liability is DGCL 
section 102(b)(7) (or its equivalent statute in other states), which authorizes an 
exculpatory provision in a corporation’s certificate of incorporation.69 Section 
102(b)(7) allows corporations to write into their charter a provision that elimi-
nates monetary director liability for violations of the duty of care, subject to 
certain limitations.70 Directors cannot be exculpated for breaches of the duty of 
                                                                                                                           
 66 In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 124 (explaining that the courts developed the duty of care and the 
business judgment rule, which focus on the process of the decision rather than its substance and mer-
its); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872–73 (clarifying that the duty to “exercise an informed business 
judgment” falls under the duty of care); Aronson, 437 A.2d at 812 (establishing that the business 
judgment rule is based on the concept of gross negligence). If directors acted with the requisite care, 
the business judgment rule will apply and protect them. See In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 122 (explain-
ing that the business judgment presumption protects directors who were well-informed and not grossly 
negligent in making the decision). 
 67 Aronson, 437 A.2d at 812; see Griffith, supra note 63, at 660 (stating that the courts cannot 
impose liability unless the business judgment presumption has been rebutted and overcome by the 
plaintiff); see, e.g., Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 707 (Del. 2009) (concluding that plaintiffs 
provided sufficient facts to rebut and overcome the business judgment presumption where directors 
rejected a merger opportunity that was of benefit to the company). 
 68 Griffith, supra note 63, at 660; see Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) 
(establishing that, in order to overcome the business judgment presumption, plaintiffs must prove that 
directors breached one of their required duties: the duty of care, the duty of loyalty, or the duty of 
good faith); see also In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 124 (stating that “absent an allegation of interested-
ness or disloyalty to the corporation, the business judgment rule prevents a judge or jury from second 
guessing director decisions if they were the product of a rational process and the directors availed 
themselves of all material and reasonably available information”). The business judgment presump-
tion can also be rebutted by proving that the directors’ actions were fraudulent, illegal, or wasteful. 
Nees, supra note 31, at 226. 
 69 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). In order to form a corporation, a company must file a cer-
tificate of incorporation, or “charter.” ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 8, at 82–83. This document 
states the purpose of the corporation, its powers, and spells out all the special features the corporation 
has. Id. at 83. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 states the information that must be included in the certifi-
cate of incorporation and information that may be included. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)–(b). 
Every state has a law analogous to DGCL section 102(b)(7). Nees, supra note 31, at 218; see, e.g., 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.037(2) (2015) (allowing corporations to limit the duties of directors by includ-
ing an exculpatory provision to limit liability). 
 70 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). This elimination does not apply to violations of the duty of 
loyalty and the duty of good faith, among other limitations. Id. Delaware law only extends this protec-
tion to directors; however, other states also extend the exculpatory protection to officers. Richard B. 
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loyalty, breaches of the duty of good faith, action or inaction involving inten-
tional misconduct or knowing violation of the law, or transactions that improp-
erly benefit the directors.71 
In 1986, the Delaware legislature enacted DGCL section 102(b)(7) in re-
sponse to the unusual holding from the Delaware Supreme Court in Smith v. 
Van Gorkom.72 Smith was the first Delaware case to hold directors liable for 
breach of the duty of care as the result of a business decision.73 State legisla-
tures did not want this threat of liability to disincentivize capable and qualified 
directors from serving on boards, so Delaware and other states quickly created 
this statutory authority for exculpatory provisions.74 Together, the business 
judgment rule and DGCL section 102(b)(7) (or its equivalent) protect directors 
from legal liability.75 
II. THE NARROWING OF OVERSIGHT LIABILITY DOCTRINE AND THE 
INCREASED DIFFICULTY OF FINDING LIABILITY 
The imposition of liability on directors under an oversight liability claim 
has been said to possibly be the “most difficult theory in corporation law upon 
which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”76 Oversight liability claims 
can be brought under the duty of care or the duty of loyalty.77 The distinction 
                                                                                                                           
Kapnick & Courtney A. Rosen, The Exculpatory Clause Defense to Shareholder Derivative Claims, 
17 BUS. TORTS. J. 1, 1 (2010). 
 71 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(i)–(iv) (listing the limitations on exculpatory provi-
sions). 
 72 Smith, 488 A.2d at 881; Kapnick & Rosen, supra note 70. The issue in Smith was whether the 
board’s decision to approve a merger was an informed decision. 488 A.2d at 874. The plaintiffs con-
tended that the Court of Chancery incorrectly applied the business judgment rule. Id. at 871. 
 73 ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 8, at 246; see Smith, 488 A.2d at 881 (refusing to apply the 
business judgment rule and imposing liability because directors were grossly negligent by failing to 
make an informed business decision regarding a merger). The courts had occasionally imposed direc-
tor liability for breach of the duty of care prior to Smith; however, those cases involved situations 
where directors failed to prevent fraud or other illegal activity. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 8, at 
246. 
 74 Yaniv Grinstein & Stefano Rossi, Good Monitoring, Bad Monitoring, REV. FIN. 1719, 1722 
(2016). DGCL section 102(b)(7) or its equivalent, like the demanding standard for oversight liability 
under Caremark and for the application of the business judgment rule, serves to protect directors from 
liability. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7); supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing the 
function of the business judgment rule). Within ten years of the Smith decision and the implementa-
tion of section 102(b)(7), about forty other states implemented similar authority for such an exculpato-
ry provision. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 8, at 246. 
 75 See supra notes 62–74 and accompanying text. 
 76 In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 125 (Del. Ch. 2009) (quoting In 
re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996)). 
 77 See In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (explaining that oversight liability can be found based 
upon negligent director decisions or upon director inaction and a lack of attention that caused loss to 
the corporation—a Caremark claim); see also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (estab-
lishing that Caremark claims involving failure to act in good faith result in oversight liability only 
when there is a breach of the duty of loyalty); Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys. v. Corbat, No. 
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between these two avenues for liability is significant because of the difference 
in standards of review for breach of these duties.78 If the oversight liability 
claim alleges a breach of the duty of care, the standard of review is simply 
gross negligence and reckless disregard.79 If the claim alleges a breach of the 
duty of loyalty (a Caremark claim), then plaintiffs must also prove that the di-
rectors acted in bad faith.80 An oversight claim alleging a breach of the duty of 
loyalty is thus much more difficult to prove.81 
Although it appears that these two duties provide plaintiffs with multiple 
avenues to show oversight liability, plaintiff success under either of these 
claims is rare and unlikely absent an obvious violation of the law.82 This Part 
discusses the burdens and obstacles that plaintiffs encounter when attempting 
to prove an oversight liability claim.83 Section A discusses the fate of the busi-
ness judgment rule and exculpatory provisions permitted under DGCL section 
102(b)(7) after the Stone decision and their application to and effect on over-
                                                                                                                           
CV 12151-VCG, 2017 WL 6452240, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2017) (explaining that plaintiffs can 
bring oversight claims for breach of the duty of care or breach of the duty of loyalty). 
 78 See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (establishing that proving bad faith is a requirement for finding 
breach of the duty of loyalty in an oversight claim); cf. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 
1984) (explaining that the standard for liability under the duty of care is gross negligence). 
 79 See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (affirming the gross-negligence standard for breach of the duty 
of care). Directors will be held liable if they act with “reckless indifference” toward the best interest of 
the corporation after being put on notice of possible illegal acts or other wrongdoings. Okla. Firefighters 
Pension & Ret. Sys., 2017 WL 6452240, at *2. 
 80 Stone, 911 A.2d at 369–70; see In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971 (setting the standard for what 
constitutes bad faith, which is required for the imposition of liability under the oversight liability doc-
trine). This bad-faith element either requires an “utter failure” to implement and maintain an adequate 
and reasonable reporting system, or, if such a system is in place and red flags are present, knowingly 
acting against the best interests of the corporation. See In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971 (establishing that 
an “utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists” establishes 
breach of the duty of good faith); see also Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys., 2017 WL 6452240, 
at *2 (explaining that in bringing an oversight liability claim under breach of the duty of loyalty, the 
plaintiff must also show lack of good faith, which requires malintent). 
 81 See In re Caremark 698 A.2d at 971 (acknowledging that showing a “sustained or systematic 
failure” to oversee is a very high standard); see also In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 125 (admitting that 
the burden on the plaintiff to prove bad faith is more difficult to meet than the burden to prove gross 
negligence). 
 82 See In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 653 (Del. Ch. 2008) (stating that the Dela-
ware Supreme Court has held that liability for an oversight claim under the duty of loyalty can only be 
imposed if there is a “strong showing of misconduct”); Nees, supra note 31, at 215–16 (stating that 
the current oversight liability doctrine does not attach unless there is a clear violation of an additional 
law); see, e.g., In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 123 (comparing the facts of the case, where there was no 
violation of the law, with those of a typical Caremark case, which involves a failure to monitor viola-
tions of the law, and declining to find oversight liability); cf. ATR-Kim Eng Fin. Corp. v. Araneta, 
No. CIV.A. 489-N, 2006 WL 3783520, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2006) (finding liability where mem-
bers of the board failed to oversee and monitor another director who engaged in self-dealing), aff’d, 
930 A.2d 928 (Del. 2007). ATR-Kim is one of the few examples of the imposition of liability for fail-
ure to oversee. Nees, supra note 31, at 216 n.65. 
 83 See infra notes 86–120 and accompanying text. 
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sight liability claims.84 Section B discusses the evolution in case law after 
Stone that narrowly applied the oversight liability doctrine, making it more 
difficult for plaintiffs to be successful on these claims.85 
A. The Survival of DGCL Section 102(b)(7) and the  
Business Judgment Rule 
Stone created some uncertainty as to whether future courts would broaden 
the ability to find directors liable or narrow it further.86 One uncertainty was 
whether DGCL section 102(b)(7) and the business judgment rule would still 
apply in oversight liability cases.87 Post-Stone, Delaware courts have made it 
very clear that directors are still protected by exculpatory provisions permitted 
under DGCL section 102(b)(7) and the business judgment rule.88 
In Desimone v. Barrows, the court clarified that rather than eliminating the 
protections of exculpatory provisions permitted under DGCL section 102(b)(7), 
Stone actually ensured that such protections given to directors would not be 
eliminated, even at the motion to dismiss stage.89 Because of this survival, if a 
corporation includes this exculpatory provision in its certificate of incorpora-
tion, the duty of care argument is eliminated for plaintiffs, and they must argue 
                                                                                                                           
 84 See infra notes 86–102 and accompanying text. 
 85 See infra notes 103–120 and accompanying text. 
 86 See Petrin, supra note 16, at 447–51 (explaining the questions that were left unanswered after 
the Stone decision); see also Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 935 (Del. Ch. 2007) (stating that 
after Stone, there was a question of whether directors would be subject to increased liability through 
potential elimination of the knowledge requirement). 
 87 Petrin, supra note 16, at 448–49. Stone held that director failure to oversee is a failure to act in 
good faith, which is a breach of the duty of loyalty. 911 A.2d at 370. Because the business judgment 
rule and DGCL section 102(b)(7) are significantly connected—mainly to the duty of care—it was uncer-
tain whether these protections would still apply in oversight liability cases. See Petrin, supra note 16, at 
448–49 (stating that because of the classification of failures of oversight as a breach of the duty of 
loyalty, it was unclear if directors would be protected by the business judgment rule, and concluding 
that because oversight fell under the duty of loyalty instead of the duty of care, directors would not be 
protected by DGCL section 102(b)(7)). 
 88 See Desimone, 924 A.2d at 935 n.95 (reaffirming the protections that directors are entitled to 
under Caremark and stating that Stone did not weaken the discretion that directors are given to ad-
dress issues of compliance with the law as they see fit). 
 89 See id. at 935 (explaining that Stone reinforced the knowledge requirement and its application 
to oversight claims, and that by doing this, the court ensured protection of the exculpatory provision). 
In Desimone, defendant-directors allegedly allowed stock of the corporation to be granted to employees, 
whose option-grant date was backdated to the lowest trading price. Id. at 913. This fraudulent activity is 
known as backdating of stock options, and its appeal is that it increases the value of the stock option. 
Petrin, supra note 16, at 451 n.86. A stock option gives the holder of the stock the right (not the obliga-
tion) to sell or buy the contracted-for stock for a predetermined price within a set period of time. Stock 
options, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Plaintiffs claimed that this was a breach of the 
directors’ fiduciary duty and brought oversight liability claims under Caremark. See Desimone, 924 A.2d 
at 939–40 (explaining that the plaintiffs alleged that directors were unaware of the backdating due to their 
abandonment of their duty of oversight and monitoring). The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the 
case, and the court granted it. Id. at 908. 
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oversight liability under the non-exculpated breach of the duty of loyalty, 
which is a more difficult standard to meet.90 In other words, absent a showing 
of bad faith, directors cannot be held liable for failure of oversight if an com-
pany has an exculpatory provision.91 It is almost impossible to find liability for 
failure of oversight based on a breach of the duty of care due to the prevalence 
of this exculpatory provision.92 Additionally, if corporations take advantage of 
this exculpatory provision, plaintiffs cannot rebut the business judgment pre-
sumption by showing breach of the duty of care, again making rebuttal more 
difficult.93 
Moreover, in In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, the 
court acknowledged that a director’s duty of oversight does not eliminate the 
protections that directors are given under the business judgment rule.94 The 
                                                                                                                           
 90 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2018); see Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 141 (Del. 2008) 
(quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 501 (Del. Ch. 2003)) (stating that when directors are ex-
culpated from liability for certain conduct, liability is only a significant threat if a plaintiff pleads a 
claim that is not exculpated in the certificate of incorporation); Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys., 
2017 WL 6452240, at *2 (explaining that if directors are exculpated from liability for breach of the 
duty of care, a plaintiffs’ only avenue for finding liability is proving that director inaction or failure to 
oversee was a breach of the duty of loyalty, which requires that directors knowingly acted against the 
best interest of the corporation in the presence of red flags); Nees, supra note 31, at 219 (explaining 
that this exculpatory provision eliminates liability for gross negligence and leaves plaintiffs to rely on 
showing breach of the duty of loyalty or good faith); see, e.g., Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 
235, 239 (Del. 2009) (finding that the exculpatory provision in Lyondell’s certificate of incorporation 
eliminated liability for breach of the duty of care, leaving plaintiffs to contend that defendants should 
be held liable under the duty of loyalty). 
 91 See John F. Savarese, Failure-of-Oversight Claims Against Directors, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 15, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/01/15/
failure-of-oversight-claims-against-directors [https://perma.cc/HKA4-ZMCS] (explaining the applica-
tion of oversight liability doctrine in Central Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Dimon, 638 F. App’x 34 (2d 
Cir. 2016) (summary order)); see also Stone, 911 A.2d at 369–70 (establishing that oversight liability 
falls under the duty of loyalty and reaffirming that breach of good faith is a condition of finding liabil-
ity under the duty of loyalty) (quoting Guttman, 823 A.2d at 506). 
 92 See Nees, supra note 31, at 218 n.72 (explaining that about 90% of corporations include an 
exculpatory provision in their certificate of incorporation that eliminates liability for breach of the 
duty of care). For those corporations that do not have an exculpatory provision, oversight liability 
claims can be brought under breach of the duty of care; however, the standard of review will be gross 
negligence, which although easier, is still a difficult one to prove. See Okla. Firefighters Pension & 
Ret. Sys., 2017 WL 6452240, at *2; see also In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 125 (acknowledging the 
difficulty of the gross-negligence standard of review). 
 93 See, e.g., Lear, 967 A.2d at 647–48 (explaining that the plaintiffs must show that directors 
breached their duty of loyalty in order to rebut the business judgment presumption and survive the 
motion to dismiss because the defendants are protected by the exculpatory provision, eliminating 
liability for breach of the duty of care). 
 94 See In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 125 (stating that the business judgment rule is in place to pro-
tect and encourage directors and managers to follow through with riskier transactions without the fear 
of liability if those investments or transactions fail); Peter Atkins, Directors’ Duty of Oversight in a 
Meltdown, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 8, 2009), https://corpgov.
law.harvard.edu/2009/03/08/directors-duty-of-oversight-in-a-meltdown/ [https://perma.cc/G8CD-
S673] (pointing out that the decision in Citigroup emphasizes the presence and survival of the busi-
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continued application of the business judgment presumption in oversight liabil-
ity claims is another significant obstacle that hinders plaintiffs from obtaining 
a judgment in their favor.95 Plaintiffs can successfully rebut the presumption 
by proving that the directors’ actions were fraudulent, illegal, wasteful, or that 
the directors breached a fiduciary duty.96 Because of the nature of an oversight 
liability claim, courts are unlikely to see inaction or failure to oversee as 
fraudulent, illegal or wasteful, leaving plaintiffs with no option but to prove 
breach of a fiduciary duty.97 Proving a breach of fiduciary duty is mostly lim-
ited to proving a breach of the duty of loyalty (which is harder to prove than a 
breach of the duty of care), because of the prevalence of exculpatory provi-
sions in certificates of incorporation as permitted by DGCL section 102(b)(7) 
(or its local equivalent).98 
The early procedural timing of the application of the business judgment 
rule adds an additional hurdle for plaintiffs.99 The business judgment rule is 
                                                                                                                           
ness judgment rule in shareholder litigation). The Citigroup court also acknowledged that the business 
judgment rule continues to apply regardless of how significant the corporation’s losses were. In re 
Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 131. The Citigroup and Desimone holdings show the Delaware courts’ com-
mitment to keep the imposition of liability narrow, shielding directors from personal liability. Petrin, 
supra note 16, at 452. 
 95 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 362 (Del. Ch. 1998) (affirming that 
“it is the essence of the business judgment rule that a court will not apply 20/20 hindsight to second 
guess a board’s decision, except ‘in rare cases [where] a transaction may be so egregious on its face 
that board approval cannot meet the test of business judgment’” (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815)); 
see also In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 125 (admitting that the burden that the plaintiff has to rebut the 
business judgment presumption is high due to the challenge of proving gross negligence or bad faith). 
 96 See Nees, supra note 31, at 226 (stating the ways in which the business judgment presumption 
can be rebutted); see also supra note 68 (describing the five ways that plaintiffs can rebut the business 
judgment presumption). 
 97 See Nees, supra note 31, at 226–27 (explaining the unlikelihood of classifying failure to act as 
illegal, fraudulent, or wasteful). Failure to act will not likely be illegal unless there is failure to comply 
with some statute or regulation. Id. Inaction will not likely be classified as fraud absent some “false 
statement of material fact made with the intent to induce action.” Id. at 227. Additionally, inaction will 
likely not be waste, because the test for waste is very strict, narrowly applied, and rarely used. Id. at 
226 n.121. Regarding the waste argument, Lewis v. Vogelstein states that “waste entails an exchange 
of corporate assets for consideration so disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range at which a 
reasonable person might be willing to trade . . . . [It is] a transfer of corporate assets that serves no 
corporate purpose; or for which no consideration is received.” 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997); see 
Nees, supra note 31, at 226 n.121 (quoting Lewis, 699 A.2d at 336). 
 98 Nees, supra note 31, at 227; see Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys., 2017 WL 6452240, at 
*1–2 (explaining that plaintiffs must prove breach of the duty of loyalty in order to overcome the 
business judgment presumption where there is an exculpatory provision in the company’s certificate 
of incorporation); see, e.g., Lear, 967 A.2d at 647–48 (limiting the plaintiffs to arguing breach of the 
duty of loyalty to overcome the business judgment presumption due to an exculpatory provision elim-
inating liability for breach of the duty of care). 
 99 See Nees, supra note 31, at 225 (arguing that plaintiffs are hindered by the difficulty of plead-
ing and proving facts establishing breach of a fiduciary duty at the beginning of a case). In a share-
holder derivative action, the shareholders are bringing a claim on behalf of the corporation. Carole F. 
Wilder, The Demand Requirement and the Business Judgment Rule: Synergistic Procedural Obstacles 
to Shareholder Derivative Suits, 5 PACE L. REV. 633, 633 (1985). Prior to commencing a shareholder 
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used as the standard for whether plaintiffs have satisfied the demand require-
ment necessary to commence a shareholder derivative action against direc-
tors.100 The issue that plaintiffs encounter is that properly establishing a breach 
of a duty necessary to rebut the business judgment presumption requires exten-
sive fact finding, which is more easily done in the discovery stage of the 
                                                                                                                           
derivative action against directors, shareholders must first satisfy the demand requirement, which 
requires shareholders to demand that the board to bring the suit themselves. Id. at 635; see Hawes v. 
Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460–61 (1882) (establishing the demand requirement). This demand require-
ment ensures that shareholders tried everything they could within the corporation to address the issue 
prior to bringing an action that generally belongs to the corporation itself rather than to the sharehold-
ers. Hawes, 104 U.S. at 460–61. Every state requires that shareholders demand the board to bring the 
suit themselves before the shareholders can bring the suit on behalf of the corporation. Wilder, supra 
at 635 n.9. An exception to the demand requirement is the futility exception. Id. at 636. If the demand 
would have been “futile,” plaintiffs are excused from making such a demand and can continue with 
bringing the lawsuit against the directors. Id.; see Cathedral Estates v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85, 
88 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that demand is excused if such demand “would be ‘futile,’ ‘useless,’ or 
‘unavailing’”). 
 100 See Bradley R. Aronstam & Irwin H. Warren, Delaware’s Business Judgment Rule and Vary-
ing Standards for Judicial Review for Assessing Director Conduct in M&A Transactions 7 (Canadian 
Inst., 2007), http://www.ramllp.com/media/article/12_Canadian%20Institute%20Article.pdf [https://
perma.cc/NSE6-CDBX] (explaining that, in addition to the substantive component of the business 
judgment rule, the rule also has a procedural component as the test for pre-litigation demand). The 
board’s decision to reject demand is subject to the business judgment rule. Id. at 9. If demand is re-
jected, the plaintiff has the burden of rebutting the business judgment presumption at this early stage 
in the litigation. See Wilder, supra note 99, at 635 (explaining that the plaintiff has to show to the 
court that the board’s decision to reject demand should not be respected). If the plaintiff fails to over-
come the presumption, the case will be dismissed. See id. at 365–66 (stating that it is rare that courts 
allow cases to continue after demand has been rejected); see also Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 
777 (Del. 1990) (stating that “absent an abuse of discretion, if the requirements of the traditional busi-
ness judgment rule are met, the board of directors’ decision not to pursue the derivative claim will be 
respected the courts”). In determining whether the rejection of demand should be upheld, the courts 
will look at whether the rejection can be “attributed to any rational purpose,” which is an easy stand-
ard to meet. Aronstam & Warren, supra, at 9–10. Therefore, most plaintiffs attempt to satisfy the 
futility exception instead of trying to show that the rejection did not have a rational purpose. Id. at 10. 
Excusing demand due to futility is also subject to a strict standard that revolves around the business 
judgment rule. See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 (Del. 1993) (stating the requirements for 
determining demand futility in situations where there is no business decision by the directors); Ar-
onson, 473 A.2d at 814 (establishing the requirements for determining demand futility in situations 
where plaintiffs are challenging a director decision). For situations where shareholders are challenging 
a business decision made by the board, in order to be excused from making demand, the plaintiffs 
must show that the alleged facts create a reasonable doubt that: (1) the directors are disinterested and 
independent; and (2) the business decision is a result of a “valid exercise of business judgment.” Ar-
onson, 473 A.2d at 814. Where demand futility is being determined in the absence of a business deci-
sion (inaction by directors), in order to excuse demand, plaintiffs must show that their alleged facts 
“create a reasonable doubt that, as of the time the complaint is filed, the board of directors could have 
properly exercised its independent and disinterested business judgment in responding to a demand.” 
Rales, 634 A.2d at 934. Arguing demand futility is an essential component of a plaintiff’s case, yet it 
imposes a very heavy burden on the plaintiff. See Aronstam & Warren, supra, at 11 (explaining that 
failure to successfully plead demand futility results in a dismissal before the court can address the 
merits of the case). 
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case.101 Without sufficient facts in the pleading at the outset to show possible 
breach of a fiduciary duty, the court will likely dismiss the case.102 
B. The Narrowed Application of Oversight Liability Doctrine 
In addition to allowing the survival of indemnification as permitted by 
DGCL section 102(b)(7) and continuing to apply the business judgment pre-
sumption in oversight liability claims, the courts have narrowly interpreted the 
elements of oversight liability and strictly applied the doctrine, producing ob-
stacles for plaintiffs.103 Stone significantly narrowed the application of over-
sight liability by establishing that a Caremark claim falls under the duty of 
loyalty.104 This eliminated the breach of the duty of care argument for Care-
mark claims (assuming that it is not already eliminated by an exculpatory pro-
vision in the particular case) and imposed a more challenging standard on 
plaintiffs, who now must prove bad faith, as is required to find liability under 
the duty of loyalty.105 Additionally, Stone rejected the possibility of imposing 
                                                                                                                           
 101 See Nees, supra note 31, at 228 (explaining that the procedural component of the business 
judgment rule is an obstacle for plaintiffs, because, although plaintiffs can request access to the corpo-
ration’s books and records, the facts needed to prove the intent to cause harm or a conscious disregard 
of duty by the directors is more easily done during the deposition or discovery stage of the litigation); 
see also Lear, 967 A.2d at 640, 647 (holding that, at the motion to dismiss stage, the plaintiffs “cannot 
rely on conclusory allegations,” but “must plead specific facts that support the inference that the Lear 
directors breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty”); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815 (establishing that “the 
mere threat of personal liability for approving a questioned transaction, standing alone, is insufficient 
to challenge either the independence or disinterestedness of directors, although in rare cases, a transac-
tion may be so egregious on its face that board approval cannot meet the test of business judgment, 
and a substantial likelihood of director liability therefore exists”). Discovery is the process where 
parties in a suit exchange information about their witnesses and their evidence. Discovery, ENCYCLO-
PAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/discovery-law [https://perma.cc/2X2K-AGMT]. 
 102 See Wilder, supra note 99, at 648 (acknowledging that the application of the business judg-
ment rule to the demand requirement has prevented most shareholder derivative suits from advancing 
past the pleading stage). 
 103 See infra notes 104–120 and accompanying text. 
 104 See Stone, 911 A.2d at 369–70 (establishing that failure to perform oversight duties under 
Caremark is a violation of the duty of loyalty). 
 105 See id. (affirming that acting in good faith is a condition and requirement of the duty of loyalty 
and holding that, in order to prove bad faith, plaintiffs must show knowledge or “conscious disregard” 
of duties); In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971 (establishing that lack of good faith must be proven to 
impose liability for breach of the duty of loyalty). This standard has a knowledge requirement, which 
is very difficult to prove. See In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 123 (clarifying that to be successful on an 
oversight claim, plaintiffs must prove that the directors had knowledge that they were not following 
through with their required duties or that the directors showed “conscious disregard” for their duties 
and responsibilities); Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (holding that in order to impose liability, plaintiffs must 
prove that directors knowingly disregarded their duties by failing to implement a reporting system or 
failing to act in the presence of red flags provided by the reporting system); In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 
at 971 (establishing the demanding test for liability in oversight claims: lack of good faith is only 
proven by showing a “sustained or systematic failure” to oversee). Moreover, the definition of good 
faith is not fully developed by the courts and within corporate law, making the application of the doc-
trine more difficult. See In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 63 (stating that, although the duty of good 
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liability by simply showing lack of good faith, eliminating yet another ave-
nue.106 
Subsequent courts have significantly hindered plaintiffs’ ability to suc-
ceed in an oversight claim under the duty of loyalty.107 It appears that liability 
will only be imposed in extreme circumstances where there is clear miscon-
duct.108 Moreover, in Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, the Supreme Court of 
Delaware narrowed the definition of bad faith with respect to oversight liabil-
ity claims.109 The case involved a merger between two companies: Lyondell 
Chemical Co. and Basell AF.110 The plaintiffs contended that directors 
breached their duty of loyalty by employing defective negotiation methods and 
approving the merger on the basis of self-interest.111 In recognizing a distinc-
                                                                                                                           
faith has been discussed by scholars, it is still an under-developed area of corporate law and not com-
pletely addressed by courts). 
 106 See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (holding that good faith is not an independent duty and that liabil-
ity cannot be imposed under the duty of good faith alone). Unlike the duty of good faith, breach of the 
duty of care or loyalty can directly lead to the imposition of liability. Id. 
 107 See infra notes 108–120 and accompanying text. 
 108 See Wood, 953 A.2d at 143 (concluding that the plaintiffs failed to provide facts that proved 
that the director defendants “knew or should have been on notice” of employee misconduct or that 
directors allowed or engaged in such illegal conduct); Lear, 967 A.2d at 654–55 (stating that in a 
transactional context, only an extreme set of facts would show that directors consciously disregarded 
their duties, and acknowledging that there must be a “strong showing of misconduct” to impose liabil-
ity for breach of the duty of loyalty for failing to act in good faith); Petrin, supra note 16, at 456 (ex-
plaining that case law shows that “an extreme set of facts is necessary in order to state a credible over-
sight claim” even outside the transactional context). In Wood, plaintiff shareholders alleged that the 
directors of MME Corporation breached their fiduciary duties by: (1) causing the company to improp-
erly value assets and issue false financial statements, which is a violation of the law; (2) causing the 
company to make “improper charitable contributions;” (3) causing the company to engage in improper 
transactions in order to improve financial performance; and (4) failing to “institute, administer and 
maintain adequate accounting and reporting controls” which led to significant losses by the corpora-
tion. 953 A.2d at 139. The court dismissed the case because the plaintiffs failed to provide specific 
facts that proved that directors knowingly violated the law or that directors failed to properly fulfill 
their duty of oversight. Id. at 143. The court additionally acknowledged that “under Delaware law, red 
flags ‘are only useful when they are either waved in one’s face or displayed so that they are visible to 
the careful observer.’” Id. In Lear, shareholders filed a suit against directors alleging that the directors 
breached their duty of loyalty and good faith because they agreed to a merger agreement knowing that 
the shareholders would disapprove of both the share price and the termination provision. 967 A.2d at 
641, 647. The court ultimately held that the plaintiffs did not plead sufficient facts to prove conscious 
and intentional disregard of duties and breach of the duty of loyalty by the directors. See id. at 647–48 
(establishing the standard of facts that plaintiffs had to show in order to survive the motion to dismiss 
and concluding that plaintiff’s arguments were “unpersuasive”). 
 109 See 970 A.2d at 243–44 (holding that complete failure in director oversight responsibility is nec-
essary to find a breach of the duty of loyalty). 
 110 Id. at 237. Lyondell was a publicly traded chemical company and Basell was a private compa-
ny in the business of polyolefin technology. Id. 
 111 Id. at 239. The plaintiffs alleged that directors breached their duty of loyalty and care; howev-
er, because Lyondell had an exculpatory provision in its certificate of incorporation, the duty of care 
argument was eliminated. Id. The complaint contained five allegations: (1) a “grossly insufficient” 
merger price; (2) self-interested motivation to approve the merger on behalf of the directors; (3) defec-
tive negotiation practices; (4) approval of “unreasonable deal protection provisions”; and (5) omission 
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tion between inadequately carrying out one’s duties and consciously disregard-
ing those duties, the court concluded that liability could only be imposed 
where directors “knowingly and completely failed” in carrying out their duties, 
which was not the case here.112 This interpretation of good faith can be inter-
preted to mean that directors only have to put in a minimal effort to fulfill their 
duties and still escape liability.113 
Courts have also declined to apply the oversight liability doctrine and the 
Caremark standard in the context of “business risk.”114 In In re Citigroup Inc. 
Shareholder Derivative Litigation, Citigroup invested in the subprime mort-
gage market, which eventually led to significant losses by the corporation.115 
In their Caremark claim, plaintiffs contended that directors breached their fi-
duciary duties by failing to adequately monitor and control the risk that the 
corporation faced from exposure to the subprime mortgage market and by fail-
ing to disclose the losses that the corporation suffered.116 Also, plaintiffs al-
                                                                                                                           
of material facts on the preliminary proxy statement. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that during the negotiations, 
directors did not push the buyer to see if they could get a better price or do a market check to see if the 
price they were getting was a fair one. Id. at 241. 
 112 Id. at 243–44. The court clarified that failure by directors to take any specific steps is not 
enough to show a conscious disregard of their duties. Id. at 243. According to the court, there is a 
distinction between not adequately performing one’s duties and consciously disregarding one’s duties. 
Id. The court reasoned that decisions that directors make do not have to be perfect, but merely reason-
able. Id. The court criticized the trial court’s approach, and said that the question it should have asked 
was whether the directors “utterly failed to attempt to obtain the best sales price”—not whether they 
did everything they should have done to obtain it. Id. at 244. A 2016 case from the Second Circuit, 
Central Laborers’ Pension Fund, supports this narrow definition by clarifying that oversight liability 
claims against directors require “allegations of conscious misconduct and cannot be predicated on 
after-the-fact challenges to the ‘reasonableness of a corporation’s controls.’” See Savarese, supra note 
91 (citing Central Laborers Pension Fund, 638 F. App’x 34). 
 113 See Petrin, supra note 16, at 455–56 (interpreting Lyondell and acknowledging that any rea-
sonable effort, even a small one, to oversee would be enough to satisfy the directors’ obligations under 
their fiduciary duties). 
 114 See In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 126 (declining to impose liability for failure to properly antic-
ipate business risk, even for a claim framed in a Caremark context). 
 115 Id. at 112. Citigroup engaged in the subprime mortgage market as early as 2006 and began 
suffering losses in 2007. Id. The following were examples of the losses that plaintiffs alleged were 
attributed to engagement in the subprime mortgage market: a 57% decrease in Citigroup’s net income; 
affiliate bailouts; a 40% decline in dividend disbursement; more than 6,000 layoffs of Citigroup em-
ployees; a quarterly loss of $9.83 billion in January of 2008; and an additional loss of $2.5 billion in 
the second quarter of that year. Id. at 113–14. 
 116 Id. at 111. Plaintiffs alleged that under Caremark, directors were liable for failure to maintain 
proper reporting systems to alert them to potential risk. Id. at 123–24. Plaintiffs also brought a waste 
claim, alleging that Citigroup’s directors are liable for corporate waste for: (1) allowing the company 
to buy subprime loans worth $2.7 billion; (2) allowing the company to buy its own shares in order to 
inflate the price; (3) approving a multi-million-dollar retirement benefit package to a former CEO who 
is considered to be responsible for losses suffered; and (4) allowing the company to engage in bad 
investments. Id. at 111–12. 
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leged there were multiple red flags providing notice of issues in the real estate 
market and that such red flags were ignored by directors.117 
In analyzing the claims, the Delaware Chancery Court emphasized that 
there are substantial differences between failing to oversee employee viola-
tions of the law and failing to recognize a corporation’s level of business 
risk.118 The court declined to impose liability for the latter in order to prevent 
courts from second-guessing and evaluating the reasonableness of director de-
cisions.119 The court concluded that the alleged red flags did not evidence that 
the directors acted in bad faith by consciously disregarding their duties and 
ultimately dismissed the plaintiffs’ Caremark claim.120 
III. WELLS FARGO: “GAMING” AND THE “GR-EIGHT INITIATIVE” 
Cross-selling, the practice of selling additional products to prospective or 
existing customers, is a profitable sales practice and is a major component of 
the Wells Fargo business model.121 In the shareholder derivative lawsuit 
                                                                                                                           
 117 Id. at 111. The plaintiffs alleged that directors ignored multiple red flags “in pursuit of short-
term profits and at the expense of the Company’s long-term viability.” Id. The majority of the red 
flags that the plaintiffs alleged directors ignored were statements from public documents that illustrat-
ed and warned of the declining condition of financial markets, such as the subprime mortgage market. 
Id. at 114–15. A majority of the directors were members of the board during prior, Enron-related ac-
tivity and were considered to be financial experts. Id. at 124. For these reasons, the plaintiffs alleged 
that the directors should have been “especially conscious” of the present red flags. Id. The court 
viewed the claim as shareholders trying to impose liability on directors for making decisions that, 
when looking back, did not turn out well for the corporation. Id. 
 118 Id. at 131. The court compared the facts of the case with those of American International 
Group, Inc. Consolidated Derivative Litigation, 965 A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009), where there was 
fraudulent and criminal conduct by employees and failure to oversee by directors. Id. at 130. The 
court also reaffirmed its past conclusion that the company suffering losses, even significant losses, 
alone was not enough to impose personal liability on directors. Id. at 130. 
 119 See id. at 126 (stating that allowing personal liability for failing to evaluate business risk un-
dermined the already established policy of protecting directors from courts making “hindsight evalua-
tions” regarding the reasonableness of their business decisions). The court recognized that because of 
the nature of evaluating business risk, it is practically impossible for a court to make a determination 
on whether directors correctly evaluated the risk and made the “right” decision. Id. Even if directors 
correctly evaluate a business risk, there is still a chance that taking that risk could result in negative 
consequences. Id. It is completely possible that directors are merely unlucky. Id. The court did not 
want to diminish the directors’ ability to take risks that make money for the company by imposing 
liability for failing to correctly evaluate a risk. Id. Additionally, the court reasoned that it is not the 
intention of the duty of oversight to impose liability on directors for “fail[ing] to predict the future and 
properly evaluate business risk.” Id. at 131. 
 120 Id. at 112, 128. The court dismissed the case because the plaintiffs failed to fulfill the demand 
requirement and were denied the futility exception. Id. at 112. The claim regarding corporate waste 
was not dismissed. Id. The court determined that the red flags, at most, proved that the directors may 
have made a bad business decision. Id. at 128. 
 121 See WELLS FARGO & CO., WELLS FARGO & COMPANY ANNUAL REPORT 2014, at 44, 126, 
https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/investor-relations/annual-reports/2014-annual-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NA6T-AZXL] (stating that Wells Fargo’s cross-selling strategy was “to 
increase the number of products [their] customers use by offering them all of the financial products 
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against Wells Fargo and its board of directors, plaintiffs brought an oversight 
liability claim alleging breach of the duties of loyalty and good faith in connec-
tion to cross-selling.122 Plaintiffs claimed that directors breached their fiduciary 
duties by overseeing demanding sales quotas, allowing employees to open un-
authorized accounts, ignoring red flags that put them on notice of the illegal 
activity, and having inadequate risk control systems.123 
Section A details the culture that Wells Fargo directors and managers cre-
ated within the corporation that led to employee illegal conduct.124 Section B 
provides a timeline of when red flags appeared that put directors on notice of 
illegal activity.125 Section C discusses when and how the Board responded to 
such red flags.126 
                                                                                                                           
that satisfy their financial needs” and such practices are essential to Wells Fargo’s business model); 
see also Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶ 3, at 4 (claiming that defendant-directors 
stressed the fact that cross-selling was essential to the bank’s financial condition). Cross-selling is a 
profitable sales practice because it encourages customers to remain loyal to their bank. See Matt Lev-
ine, Wells Fargo Opened a Couple Million Fake Accounts, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Sept. 9, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-09-09/wells-fargo-opened-a-couple-million-fake-
accounts [https://perma.cc/G9AQ-B5GM] (explaining that if customers have multiple accounts with 
one bank, they are more likely to want more high-profile products, such as mortgages); E. Scott Reck-
ard, Wells Fargo’s Pressure-Cooker Sales Culture Comes at a Cost, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2013), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-fargo-sale-pressure-20131222-story.html [https://perma.
cc/88L5-KLME] (explaining that multiple products in the hands of one customer discourages the 
customer from switching banks). In 2014, defendant Carrie L. Tolstedt, the then-Senior Executive 
Vice President, Community Banking, commented: “the cross-sell model . . . drive[s] revenue.” Com-
plaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶ 4, at 5. 
 122 See Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶ 526, at 112 (stating the claims that 
the plaintiffs brought against the directors and explaining the ways in which the directors breached 
their duties). The plaintiffs also argued that the defendants breached their duty of candor and reasona-
ble inquiry. Id. Although arguing breach of the duty of care is an easier standard to meet, the plaintiffs 
were barred from arguing such a claim because Wells Fargo has an exculpatory provision in its certif-
icate of incorporation, eliminating liability for breach of the duty of care. See Wells Fargo & Co., 
Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Wells Fargo & Company (Form 10-K, ex. 3a) (Feb. 28, 2012), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72971/000119312512084528/d280360dex3a.htm [https://
perma.cc/BQ47-ZS9L] (stating that directors will not be held monetarily liable for breach of their 
fiduciary duties except for situations under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174 (“Liability of directors for 
unlawful payment of dividend or unlawful stock purchase or redemption;  exoneration from liability; 
 contribution among directors;  subrogation”), situations involving breaches of the duty of loyalty or 
good faith, and situations where a director receives an improper benefit from a transaction). 
 123 See Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶ 526, at 112–13 (listing allegations of 
breach on the part of the directors). Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the directors breached their 
duties by: structuring the compensation policies which incentivized employees to engage in illegal activi-
ties and rewarding executives with bonuses for cross-selling; “allowing Wells Fargo insiders to conduct 
insider sales and dispositions of company stock while in the possession of material, adverse, non-public 
information”; allowing the repurchase of Wells Fargo shares that were artificially inflated; allowing for 
false public statements on cross-selling which artificially increased the Wells Fargo share price; and “en-
gaging in abuse of control and gross mismanagement of Wells Fargo’s assets and business through a 
failure to prevent the illicit account-creation scheme.” Id. 
 124 See infra notes 127–145 and accompanying text. 
 125 See infra notes 146–161 and accompanying text. 
 126 See infra notes 162–176 and accompanying text. 
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A. Pressures to Meet Demanding Quotas and the  
Logistics Behind “Gaming” 
Former Wells Fargo Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and board member 
Dick Kovacevich created a sales initiative with the sales motto “Going for Gr-
Eight” or “Eight is Great,” referred to as the “Gr-Eight Initiative.”127 The goal 
of this sales model was for employees to sell at least eight Wells Fargo prod-
ucts to each customer.128 This slogan and sales model continued within Wells 
Fargo even after Kovacevich was replaced by John Stumpf as CEO in 2007.129 
The “Gr-Eight Initiative” led to directors and officers imposing and enforcing 
demanding sales quotas regarding the number of products each employee had 
to sell each day.130 Consequently, plaintiffs alleged that the pressures to meet 
the quotas was the driving force that led Wells Fargo bankers to open the unau-
thorized bank accounts and commit fraud.131 
                                                                                                                           
 127 Bethany McLean, How Wells Fargo’s Cutthroat Corporate Culture Allegedly Drove Bankers 
to Fraud, VANITY FAIR (2017), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/05/wells-fargo-corporate-
culture-fraud [https://perma.cc/GK9F-BKFS] [hereinafter McLean, Cutthroat Corporate Culture]. 
Kovacevich started this initiative in 1997 and when asked why “eight,” he responded: “[i]t rhymes 
with GREAT!” Id. Kovacevich compared banking and selling money to operations at any other store 
trying to sell products. See id. (referring to an interview with Kovacevich in which Kovacevich im-
plied that “bank branches were like ‘stores,’ and bankers were ‘salespeople’ whose job was to ‘cross-
sell,’ which meant getting ‘customers’—not ‘clients,’ but ‘customers’—to buy as many products as 
possible”); Bethany McLean, Is This Guy the Best Banker in America?, FORTUNE (July 6, 1998), 
http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1998/07/06/244842/index.htm [https://
perma.cc/ET6N-FLCL] [hereinafter McLean, Is This Guy the Best Banker in America?] (reporting 
that Kovacevich said that he sells money the same way that “Home Depot sells screwdrivers”). 
 128 Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶¶ 1–2, at 4; Complaint, California v. 
Wells Fargo, supra note 12, ¶ 4, at 2; McLean, Cutthroat Corporate Culture, supra note 127. 
 129 See Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶ 3, at 4 (claiming that between 2011 
and 2017, defendant-directors stressed the fact that cross-selling was and is essential to the bank’s 
financial condition); WELLS FARGO & COMPANY ANNUAL REPORT 2014, supra note 121, at 126 
(showing that cross-selling was still a major part of Wells Fargo business model in 2014); Wells Far-
go Names Stumpf CEO; Kovacevich Remains Chair, CNBC (June 27, 2007), https://www.cnbc.com/
id/19452417 [https://perma.cc/9TSQ-FTT6] (reporting that Stumpf will replace Kovacevich as CEO). 
Stumpf referred to Wells Fargo as “the king of cross-sell[ing].” Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., 
supra note 1, at ¶¶ 3–4. In addition to CEO, Stumpf held the following other positions within Wells 
Fargo: board of director member (2006–2016); Chairman of the Board (2010–2016); President (2005–
2015); Chief Operating Officer (2005–2007); and other management and senior management posi-
tions. Id. ¶ 70, at 15. 
 130 Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶ 2, at 4. Management encouraged the illegal 
activity by incentivizing employees with bonuses. Egan, 2 Million Phony Accounts, supra note 1. 
 131 See Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶ 2, at 4 (explaining that the strict quo-
tas lead to significant amount of pressure on bankers to meet those quotas, driving employees to ille-
gally open the unauthorized accounts); Complaint, California v. Wells Fargo, supra note 12, ¶ 5, at 2 
(stating that the sales quotas were strictly enforced and were difficult to meet without engaging in 
fraudulent activity); Reckard, supra note 121 (reporting that an investigation found that the intense 
pressure to sell led to “ethical breaches, consumer complaints, and labor lawsuits”). 
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The environment within any Wells Fargo bank was of high-stress for all 
employees and often described as a “pressure cooker”.132 Employees were 
trained to maximize cross-selling.133 Management constantly monitored em-
ployees and threatened, demeaned, and berated them to compel them to make 
sales.134 When target sales were not achieved for the day, employees were rep-
                                                                                                                           
 132 See generally Reckard, supra note 121 (referring to Wells Fargo as a “pressure-cooker” be-
cause of its intense environment). This pressure-filled environment had negative physical and emo-
tional effects on Wells Fargo employees. See Stacy Cowley, Voices from Wells Fargo: “I Thought I 
Was Having a Heart Attack,” N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/10/21/business/dealbook/voices-from-wells-fargo-i-thought-i-was-having-a-heart-attack.html 
[https://perma.cc/6L4R-K7F6] [hereinafter Cowley, I Thought I Was Having a Heart Attack]. Wis-
consin banker Angie Payden described the effects of her experience as a Wells Fargo banker: 
I started to have extreme physical stress-related symptoms as well as random panic at-
tacks. At some point during that summer, the stress was so intense that I could no long-
er handle the pressure. On the banker’s desk, in the bathroom, behind the teller line and 
in the vault, the store kept bottles of hand sanitizer. One morning, before meeting with a 
customer, in which I knew I was going to have to sell unneeded services, I had a panic 
attack. I went to the bathroom and took a drink of some hand sanitizer . . . . In late No-
vember 2012, I was completely addicted to hand sanitizer and drinking at least a bottle 
a day during by work day . . . . The recent news stories have reactivated my memories 
and P.T.S.D. I am now having nightmares and flashbacks of that time period. It was 
horrible. 
Id. There are accounts of employees suffering anxiety attacks, and one employee even developed 
shingles as a result of the stress. Id. 
 133 See Cowley, I Thought I Was Having a Heart Attack, supra note 132 (recounting banker Ash-
lie Storms’s experience) (“We would have conference calls with regional presidents and managers 
coaching us on how to word our selling points so that the customer can’t say no. I felt like a cheat. I 
started losing sleep and got nauseous every Sunday night over the start of the next work week.”). A 
former branch manager from the Pacific Northwest stated: “It’s all a manipulation. We are taught 
exactly how to sell multiple accounts.” Reckard, supra note 121. 
 134 Complaint, California v. Wells Fargo, supra note 12, ¶ 5, at 2, ¶ 24, at 6. Each branch reported 
its sales to district managers four times a day. Id. ¶ 5, at 2. One teller from an Illinois branch recount-
ed: 
Every day, your supervisor would make you set a sales goal, follow up on reaching that 
sales goal and coach you on how to make those sales . . . . I believe my daily product 
sales goal was six a day. It didn’t matter if you had 20 products one day, you still had to 
meet your goal every other day . . . . Even if a customer didn’t want access to online 
banking, we were taught to force them into it. 
Cowley, I Thought I Was Having a Heart Attack, supra note 132. Another banker from a Houston 
branch said: 
Managers kept a board right by the teller line where we would write how many people 
we had talked to, how many we had referred to a banker and how many sales were 
closed. At the end of the day, the manager would call out each teller in front of every-
body and share their results. It was a frightening experience. If tellers did not have any 
sales on the board, you did not want to be that person . . . . Every morning I had to sit 
with my boss and go over the previous day and every single customer’s relationship. 
Id. Banker Julie Miller was fired from her job for not meeting the sales goals one year even though 
she was in the top 2% of managers in the country for sales. Id. She moved to a new branch where she 
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rimanded and often obligated to attend meetings with management, where they 
were told to do “whatever it takes” to meet their sales goals for the day.135 Ad-
ditionally, some employees were required to work extra hours without com-
pensation for not meeting the quotas, and many were threatened with losing 
their job.136 As the civil complaint put it, “Wells Fargo put its employees be-
tween a rock and a hard place, forcing them to choose between keeping their 
jobs and opening unauthorized accounts.”137 
It was these pressures from management that pushed employees to their 
breaking points and led to the use of illegal sales practices, called “gaming”.138 
There were multiple ways that employees created bank accounts for customers 
without their authorization or knowledge.139 A common practice was “bun-
dling,” which involved product misrepresentation.140 When selling products, 
employees told customers that certain products, for example a checking ac-
count, could not be purchased individually, but instead must be purchased with 
multiple other accounts or products.141 Management encouraged this deception 
by training employees to sell these “bundles” or “packed accounts.”142 
                                                                                                                           
said that the management “would grill [employees] every day; it was nonstop badgering and berating. 
It was verbal and mental abuse.” Id. 
 135 Complaint, California v. Wells Fargo, supra note 12, ¶ 5, at 2. Sabrina Bertrand, a banker 
from Houston, stated, “I had managers in my face yelling at me . . . . They wanted you to open up dual 
checking accounts for people that couldn’t even manage their original checking account.” Matt Egan, 
Workers Tell Wells Fargo Horror Stories, CNN MONEY (Sept. 9, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/
09/09/investing/wells-fargo-phony-accounts-culture/index.html [https://perma.cc/54XK-PEKQ] [here-
inafter Egan, Wells Fargo Horror Stories]. In order to meet sales quotas, employees would resort to 
opening up unnecessary accounts for their family members. Id. At one bank, employees convinced a 
homeless woman to open up six separate accounts, all resulting in fees. Reckard, supra note 121.  
 136 Complaint, California v. Wells Fargo, supra note 12, ¶ 24, at 7. Florida branch manager Rita 
Murillo explained that when employees did not meet the sales quotas, they worked late and on week-
ends to make up for it, and anyone who was behind in sales after two months was fired. Reckard, 
supra note 121. Murillo recalled: “We were constantly told we would end up working for McDonald’s 
. . . . If we did not make sales quotas . . . we had to stay for what felt like after-school detention, or 
report to a call session on Saturdays.” Id. Another employee described the environment as a “‘cut-
throat’ environment that caused employees to fear for their job and make ‘bad ethical choices.’” Egan, 
Wells Fargo Horror Stories, supra note 135.  
 137 Complaint, California v. Wells Fargo, supra note 12, ¶ 8, at 4. 
 138 See id. ¶ 5, at 2 (alleging that the pressures within the culture at Wells Fargo banks led to 
managers and bankers to engage in “gaming”); McLean, Cutthroat Corporate Culture, supra note 
127, at 5 (quoting a Wells Fargo investigator from 2004) (“Whether real or perceived, team members 
. . . feel they cannot make sales goals without gaming the system . . . . The incentive to cheat is based 
on the fear of losing their jobs.”). 
 139 See Complaint, California v. Wells Fargo, supra note 12, ¶ 7, at 3 (explaining the logistics 
behind three examples of gaming practices: “sandbagging,” “bundling,” and “pinning”). 
 140 See id. ¶ 29, at 7 (explaining the practice of “bundling” and how it involved lying to custom-
ers). 
 141 Id. Employees also used “bundling” when customers confronted Wells Fargo about accounts that 
were opened in their name without their consent. See id. ¶ 30, at 8 (explaining that employees told cus-
tomers that the additional accounts were automatically opened with the account or product that they 
originally purchased). Customers were also advised by employees to destroy the additional cards for the 
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Moreover, bankers would move money from existing customer accounts in-
to new accounts in order to double the number of accounts opened under one 
customer’s name.143 Employees opened these new accounts using a practice 
called “pinning,” which involved changing customers’ Personal Identification 
Number (PIN) for their accounts without their knowledge or consent.144 The 
opening of these accounts resulted in a significant amount of unjustified fees.145 
B. Early Red Flags of Fraud 
The creation of fake bank accounts and other illegal practices by Wells 
Fargo bankers and management began, at the latest, in 2002 and continued 
through at least 2015.146 Former CEO Stumpf testified that he and the Board 
were not made aware of the illegal activity by employees until 2013.147 None-
theless, according to an investigation by the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC), the Board received red flags warning of the illegal practices 
                                                                                                                           
fake accounts that they received; however, employees would not close those additional accounts and the 
credit profiles of customers would remain affected. Id. ¶ 31, at 8. 
 142 Id. ¶ 29, at 7–8. Even though these products could be purchased alone, management told em-
ployees to lie to customers in order to convince them to purchase the additional “packed” account. Id. 
¶ 29, at 7. 
 143 Egan, 2 Million Phony Accounts, supra note 1. Other gaming tactics that Wells Fargo engaged in 
included lying to customers by telling them that they would incur fees on one of their accounts until and 
unless they opened additional accounts; telling customers that accounts would not incur fees when in fact 
they would; and targeting individuals who did not have social security numbers because it is easier to 
open fraudulent accounts without one. Complaint, California v. Wells Fargo, supra note 12, ¶ 36, at 9. 
 144 See Complaint, California v. Wells Fargo, supra note 12, ¶ 32, at 8 (alleging that bankers 
would change customer PINs to “0000,” which allowed the banker to enroll the customer in online 
banking, which counted as a sale). Customers did not become aware of their change in PINs or the fact 
that they were being enrolled in other bank products because employees created fake email accounts to 
which information regarding the new accounts was sent. See id. (explaining that some fake email ad-
dresses included: 1234@wellsfargo.com or noname@wellsfargo.com). 
 145 Egan, 2 Million Phony Accounts, supra note 1. Wells Fargo employees created 565,434 such 
credit card accounts, and a sample of just fourteen thousand of those accounts resulted in over 
$400,000 in fees. Id. 
 146 See THE CASE FOR HOLDING MEGABANKS ACCOUNTABLE, supra note 6, at 6, 8 (reporting 
that it is estimated that, since 2000, Wells Fargo and its subsidiaries have paid over $11 billion in 
fines for sales violations, and noting that the company had been fraudulently opening accounts since 
2002, or perhaps even earlier); Geoff Colvin, Inside Wells Fargo’s Plan to Fix Its Culture Post-
Scandal, FORTUNE (June 11, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/06/11/wells-fargo-scandal-culture 
[https://perma.cc/5GQY-SJKG] (stating that cases of “gaming” activities were reported in 2000 and 
increased as the years passed, with 1,469 reports in 2013); supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 147 Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶ 16, at 6. Stumpf’s testimonies before the 
Senate Banking Committee and the House Financial Services Committee were inconsistent. See id. 
¶ 258, at 48, ¶ 260, at 49 (reporting that before the Senate Banking Committee, Stumpf testified that 
the he and the Board became aware of the sales violations in 2013, but before the House Financial 
Services Committee, Stumpf said that the Board was made aware as early as 2011). 
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starting in 2005. 148 The Board failed to address the situation until 2016, when 
the scandal went public.149 
The Board received multiple red flags that put them on notice of the ille-
gality occurring within the bank’s branches.150 As early as 2005, the Board re-
ceived reports informing them of “gaming” and sales violation complaints that 
were called into the “EthicsLine” by employees.151 Employees also communi-
cated directly to the Board and to Stumpf to notify them that sales violations 
were occurring.152 Stumpf admitted that these reports and communications 
were coming in between 2011 and 2013; however, evidence suggests that the 
Board was directly notified years earlier.153 
                                                                                                                           
 148 See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW OF SUPERVISION 
OF SALES PRACTICES AT WELLS FARGO 5 (2017), https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-
type/other-publications-reports/pub-wells-fargo-supervision-lessons-learned-41917.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9ADR-TQGF] [hereinafter COMPTROLLER REPORT] (finding that the Board had received 
Audit & Security reports on a regular basis since 2005 informing them that the majority of the calls to 
the internal “EthicsLine” and employee firings were connected to sales violations). The plaintiff-
shareholders alleged in their complaint that the Board repeatedly ignored red flags as early as 2007. 
Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶ 16, at 6. They also alleged that the Board encour-
aged the illegal practices. See id. ¶ 2, at 4 (explaining the incentives that the Board had to turn a blind eye 
to the red flags and to encourage the illegal activity). The Office of the Comptroller of Currency (“OCC”) 
is Wells Fargo’s federal regulator. See Are All Commercial Banks Regulated and Supervised by the Fed-
eral Reserve System, or Just Major Commercial Banks?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F. (Nov. 2006, 
https://www.frbsf.org/education/publications/doctor-econ/2006/november/commercial-banks-
regulation/ [https://perma.cc/GJ4J-8UMK] (stating that national banks are regulated by the OCC). 
 149 See Egan, Where Was the Board?, supra note 6 (stating that once the public became aware of 
the fraud that was occurring within the bank, the Board finally acted on the situation). 
 150 See Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶ 16, at 6 (alleging that directors ig-
nored the multiple red flags that were present); infra notes 151–161 and accompanying text. 
 151 COMPTROLLER REPORT, supra note 148, at 5; see Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra 
note 1, ¶¶ 197–202, at 40–41 (providing examples of employees who called the “EthicsLine” to report 
illegal sales practices). In their complaint, the shareholders allege that by at least 2008, the bank be-
came aware of and began tracking these complaints. Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 
1, ¶ 23, at 8. These complaints were red flags that put the Board on notice regarding the illegal activi-
ty. Id. ¶ 208, at 42. The “EthicsLine” is a hotline that employees could call when they had concerns 
about ethics or compliance. Id. ¶ 151, at 32. The employees could report their concerns to an inde-
pendent third party, who then reported back to the bank. Id. When a complaint is filed, a summary of 
the complaint is given to the bank’s Office of Global Ethics to assess. Id. If there is an investigation, 
the bank’s Audit & Examination Committee oversees it. Id. ¶ 153, at 33. 
 152 See Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶ 196, at 40 (stating that in addition to 
using the “EthicsLine”, employees contacted Stumpf directly through email or by letter to alert him to 
the misconduct). In 2011, former branch manager Rasheeda Kamar emailed Stumpf warning him that 
employees were opening unauthorized bank accounts. Id. ¶ 200, at 40. When asked about this com-
munication during the Senate hearing, he responded that he did not remember. Id. 
 153 See id. ¶ 154, at 33 (recounting Stumpf’s testimony regarding the calls to the “EthicsLine” and 
other ethics reports). In 2007, an employee sent letters to both the Board’s Audit and Examination 
Committee and then-CEO Stumpf warning them that the “Gr-Eight Initiative” created a high-stress cul-
ture that was causing fraudulent activity. Id. ¶ 22, at 7. The letter warned: “Left unchecked, the inevita-
ble outcome shall be one of professional and reputational damage, consumer fraud and shareholder 
lawsuits, coupled with regulator sanctions.” Id. Stumpf testified that he was aware of an increase in 
reports regarding sales-practice violations in 2013. Id. ¶ 169, at 35. 
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Mass employee terminations and subsequent litigation, including wrong-
ful termination suits and whistleblower complaints, were other red flags that 
shareholders alleged had put the Board on notice as early as 2008.154 The num-
ber of terminations that occurred during the relevant “gaming” time period was 
colossal and such terminations were left uninvestigated by the Board.155 By 
2010, there were at least seven hundred cases of whistleblower complaints 
against Wells Fargo.156 Whistleblower wins for employees are extremely un-
common, yet in early 2017, Wells Fargo admitted that some of the whistle-
blower claims against it may actually have merit.157 
The 2013 Los Angeles Times investigation and article exposing the de-
manding sales quotas and illegal practices was yet another red flag according 
to shareholders.158 Stumpf testified that he was aware of the article when it 
                                                                                                                           
 154 See id. ¶ 24, at 8, ¶ 246, at 47 (alleging that the termination of 5,300 employees over the span 
of five years and wrongful termination suits brought as early as 2008 were major red flags that put the 
Board on notice of illegal activity); Piccini, supra note 60, at 2 (stating that whistleblower complaints 
are red flags that give notice). The shareholder complaint provided examples of employee litigation 
that was brought against Wells Fargo. Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶¶ 24–26, at 
8. In 2008, a former Wells Fargo employee brought a whistleblower case against Wells Fargo and 
won. Id. ¶ 24, at 8. The court found that Wells Fargo violated whistleblower protection laws by firing 
the employee after he complained about the creation of fake accounts. Id. Additionally, in 2009, six 
former employees sued Wells Fargo for wrongful termination, claiming that they were fired for fraud-
ulent activity that they were instructed by their manager to perform. Id. ¶ 25, at 8. 
 155 See Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶¶ 246–147, at 47 (stating that Wells 
Fargo fired about one thousand employees for violations of sales practices in 2011 and totaled around 
5,300 such firings during a five year period); Howell E. Jackson, One Take on the Report of the Inde-
pendent Directors of Wells Fargo: Vote the Bums Out, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 
AND FIN. REG. (Apr. 22, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/04/22/one-take-on-the-report-
of-the-independent-directors-of-wells-fargo-vote-the-bums-out [https://perma.cc/N9Q4-UUCU] (stat-
ing that the Board simply acknowledged the number of terminations and did nothing to investigate 
why they were happening). The reasons for which Wells Fargo employees were fired were usually 
inaccurate statements about employees. See Matt Egan, Wells Fargo’s Whistleblower Problem Wors-
ens, CNN MONEY (Apr. 6, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/04/06/investing/wells-fargo-whistle
blower-retaliation-osha/index.html [https://perma.cc/JH2H-72QF] [hereinafter Egan, Wells Fargo’s 
Whistleblower Problem Worsens] (providing the example of the wrongful termination of Claudia 
Ponce de Leon, a Wells Fargo general manager, who warned her bosses about the creation of fake 
bank accounts, called the “EthicsLine,” and was subsequently fired because “she drank too much”). 
Stumpf saw the termination of about 1,000 employees (1% of employees) per year between 2011 and 
2016 as good news because it meant that 99% of the employees were not committing fraud. Colvin, 
supra note 146, at 8. 
 156 COMPTROLLER REPORT, supra note 148, at 5. 
 157 See Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶ 212, at 42 (acknowledging the diffi-
culty of success under a whistleblower claim and stating that only 2% of these cases rule in favor of 
the employee); Egan, Wells Fargo’s Whistleblower Problem Worsens, supra note 155 (reporting that 
current CEO Tim Sloan said: “A few cases out of the hundreds reviewed raised questions, and we are 
following up on each of them.”). 
 158 See Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶¶ 163–170, at 34–35 (alleging that the 
investigation and article put the Board on notice that fraudulent activity was prevalent within the cor-
poration). See generally Reckard, supra note 121 (detailing the environment at Wells Fargo and how 
it led to employees committing fraud to meet demanding sales quotas). 
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came out and brought it to the attention of the Board, although this resulted in 
no further investigation by the Board.159 Lastly, shareholders alleged that Wells 
Fargo’s awareness that its behavior was the subject of federal investigations as 
far back as 2012 also put the Board on notice of illegality.160 The complaint 
argued that, taken together, all of these red flags were enough to put the Board 
on notice and enough to show that the Board either knew or should have 
known that employees were engaging in fraudulent activity.161 
C. The Board’s Response to Red Flags 
The Board failed to take action despite the presence of these red flags un-
til 2016 when federal regulators announced a large settlement with the bank.162 
The shareholder complaint in the derivative suit pointed out that there were 
strong incentives for the Board to turn a blind eye to the illegal activity and 
even encourage it.163 Cross-selling was fundamental to Wells Fargo’s business 
model, and success in cross-selling was “central to its financial results and 
market participants’ assessment of the company.”164 Financial growth led to an 
increase in the company’s stock price, which resulted in significant increases 
to executive compensation.165 
                                                                                                                           
 159 See Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶ 169, at 35 (citing to Well Fargo’s 
written response to the Senate Banking Committee). 
 160 See id. ¶ 171, at 35 (alleging that investigations by the OCC and FINRA were red flags that 
put the Board on notice). Wells Fargo was investigated by the OCC, the Consumer Finance Protection 
Bureau (CFPB) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) for misconduct between 
2012 and 2014. Id. ¶¶ 183–185, at 38. The OCC began receiving complaints from customers about the 
creation of unauthorized bank accounts in 2012, and in 2014 it launched an investigation. Id. ¶ 183, at 
38. Additionally, in 2013, the CFPB investigated whistleblower complaints filed against Wells Fargo, 
and in 2014, FINRA fined the bank for anti-money-laundering failures. Id. ¶¶ 184–185, at 38. 
 161 See id. ¶ 49, at 11–12, ¶ 208, at 42, ¶ 245, at 46 (explaining the red flags and alleging that 
these red flags showed that defendants either knew or should have known that employees were creat-
ing illegal, unauthorized accounts for customers). 
 162 THE CASE FOR HOLDING MEGABANKS ACCOUNTABLE, supra note 6, at 7–9; see Egan, Where 
Was the Board?, supra note 6 (stating that once the public became aware of the fraud that was occur-
ring within the bank, the Board finally acted on the situation); see also Complaint, In re Wells Fargo 
& Co., supra note 1, ¶ 16, at 6 (alleging that defendant directors had ignored red flags since 2007). In 
fact, the Senate Banking Committee’s hearing found that the Board failed to implement internal con-
trols or a “meaningful reporting system to adequately address significant and pervasive illegal practic-
es.” Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶ 15, at 6. Additionally, the hearing found that 
the illegal practices continued because the Board ignored them. Id. 
 163 See Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶ 2, at 4 (pointing out that Wells Far-
go’s goal in stressing a demanding cross-selling strategy was “to show steady quarterly growth in the 
opening of customer accounts, maintain the Company’s industry leadership in cross-selling, and most 
importantly, drive up the Bank’s share price”). 
 164 Id. ¶ 2, at 4; see WELLS FARGO & COMPANY ANNUAL REPORT 2014, supra note 121, at 126 
(stating that cross-selling is the “key to [Wells Fargo’s] ability to grow revenue and earnings”). 
 165 Complaint, In re Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 1, ¶ 2, at 4. Increases in the bank’s stock price 
were caused by defendants falsifying or producing misleading statements regarding cross-selling. Id. 
¶ 382, at 85. Defendants sold over $629 million of Wells Fargo stock at the artificially inflated price. 
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With the public announcement of the scandal, Stumpf resigned due to the 
allegations made against the bank.166 Although Stumpf did not receive a sever-
ance package upon resignation and agreed to return $41 million from his com-
pensation, it is reported that he still walked away with a pay package of about 
$133.1 million.167 Timothy Sloan replaced Stumpf as CEO despite admitting 
that he became aware of the scandal in 2013.168 Top executive Carrie Tolstedt 
also retired, returning $19 million yet walking away with $125 million.169 In 
                                                                                                                           
Id. Before stepping down from his position, Stumpf was the highest paid CEO in the banking industry. 
Id. ¶ 2, at 4. He received “tens of millions of dollars in salary and equity compensation every year.” 
Id. 
 166 Richard Gonzales, Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf Resigns Amid Scandal, NPR (Oct. 12, 
2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/10/12/497729371/wells-fargo-ceo-john-
stumpf-resigns-amid-scandal [https://perma.cc/UC8V-HRCM]. Prior to resigning, Stumpf was ques-
tioned by Senator Elizabeth Warren at the Senate committee hearing. Berkeley Lovelace Jr. & Anto-
nio Jose Vielma, Sen. Elizabeth Warren on Wells Fargo CEO Stumpf: ‘Gutless leadership,’ CNBC 
(Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/20/senator-warren-on-wells-fargo-ceo-gutless-
leadership.html [https://perma.cc/B49A-F7M9]. Warren asked Stumpf why he had not resigned as 
CEO, returned any personal earnings he made while the scandal was going on, or fired any senior 
executives in light of the scandal. Id. Stumpf blamed lower level employees instead of placing the 
blame on those in charge or on the demanding cross-selling sales strategy. Id.; see Lucinda Shen, 
Here’s How Much Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf Is Getting to Leave the Bank, FORTUNE (Oct. 13, 
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/13/wells-fargo-ceo-john-stumpfs-career-ends-with-133-million-
payday [https://perma.cc/7753-XNAV] (reporting that Stumpf had denied that the culture and envi-
ronment at the bank lead to the misconduct by employees and that he blamed the lower level employ-
ees). Stumpf told Congress that the scandal was not as severe as they perceived it to be. Shen, supra. 
 167 Shen, supra note 166; see Jim Puzzanghera, What Did Wells Fargo’s New CEO Know About 
the Scandal? Senators Push for Answers, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/
business/la-fi-wells-fargo-elizabeth-warren-20161020-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/C2DD-
5QKN] (explaining that Stumpf will retire with more than $100 million in vested stock plus pension 
and 401(k) benefits over $24 million). A severance package is a compensation package offered to 
employees after their employment contract ends. Severance Package, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014). The $41 million that Stumpf returned came from unvested stock awards. Puzzanghe-
ra, supra. Unvested stock is stock set aside by the company but not yet owed by the person receiving 
the stock until certain agreed upon conditions are met. Hunkar Ozyasar, What Is an Unvested Stock?, 
THE NEST, https://budgeting.thenest.com/unvested-stock-31525.html [https://perma.cc/V2KK-4YZ9]. 
Vested stock refers to shares that now are owned by the receiver and come with the right vote, sell and 
transfer. Id. 
 168 Gonzales, supra note 166; see Puzzanghera, supra note 167 (stating that Sloan admitted to 
knowledge of the scandal as far back as 2013). Prior to replacing Stumpf as CEO, Sloan served as 
Wells Fargo’s President and Chief Operating Officer (COO). Gonzales, supra note 166.  
 169 Wilfred Frost & Dawn Giel, Wells Fargo Board Slams Former CEO Stumpf and Tolstedt, 
Claws Back $75 Million, CNBC (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/10/wells-fargo-
board-slams-stumpf-and-tolstedt-claws-back-millions.html [https://perma.cc/G5Y4-ATYL]; Renae 
Merle, Wells Fargo Fired 5,300 Workers for Improper Sales Push. The Executive in Charge Is Retir-
ing With $125 Million, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2006), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2016/09/13/wells-fargo-fired-5300-workers-for-illegal-sales-push-executive-in-charge-
retiring-with-125-million [https://perma.cc/7L3C-BWYJ]. Tolstedt oversaw the community-banking 
division, which was subject to demanding sales quotas and goals. Merle, supra. Her retirement pack-
age included shares of Wells Fargo stock, options, and restricted shares. Id. Restricted shares are simi-
lar to unvested shares. See What Are Restricted Shares?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.
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2017, the Board “clawed back” an additional $28 million from Stumpf and an 
additional $47.3 million from Tolstedt.170 
In late 2016 and early 2017, the Board conducted an investigation of all 
the allegations and events that occurred between 2011 and 2016 and compiled 
a report on its findings.171 Although the report admitted that the Board should 
have acted earlier, this company-led investigative report was not particularly 
critical of the Board.172 Rather, the report blamed the fraud and illegal activity 
on lower management and the decentralized system of governance within 
Wells Fargo.173 On January 1, 2017, in the middle of the investigation and 
barely four months before the release of the report, Sloan finally changed the 
compensation system to focus on customer satisfaction and achievement of 
team goals, rather than product sales.174 He also addressed the bank’s structure 
by fully centralizing the risk and human resources functions.175 Despite the 
                                                                                                                           
com/ask/answers/061515/what-are-restricted-shares.asp [https://perma.cc/6USV-SU5D] (defining 
restricted shares as those that are not fully transferable until certain agreed upon conditions are met). 
 170 Frost & Giel, supra note 169. Between 2011 and 2016, Stumpf made $286 million. Id. Stumpf 
surrendered only 24% of his salary due to the scandal. Id. 
 171 See generally BOARD INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 5. The Board created an “oversight 
committee” to oversee the investigation. Id.; Guy Rolnick, Wells Fargo and the Failure of Boards and 
Regulators, PRO-MARKET (Apr. 25, 2017), https://promarket.org/wells-fargo-failure-boards-
regulators [https://perma.cc/D59R-ZJXD]. This committee was made up of the four independent 
board members. Rolnick, supra. The committee hired Shearman & Sterling LLP to conduct the inves-
tigation. BOARD INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 5, at 2. 
 172 See BOARD INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 5, at 16–17 (finding that the Board should 
have “moved toward the centralization of the risk function earlier than it did” and that Stumpf should 
have fired Tolstedt much earlier); see also Jackson, supra note 155, at 1 (stating that the report recog-
nized the serious misconduct, but only discussed conduct by Stumpf and Tolstedt, who had already 
retired); Rolnick, supra note 171 (acknowledging that the report “largely exonerated” the Board 
members and placed blame on the management for failing to report the misconduct right away). 
 173 See BOARD INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 5, at 4 (finding that the decentralized busi-
ness model vested too much power in senior management, who ignored the illegal activity that was 
occurring, which led to the Board missing the red flags); see also Jackson, supra note 155, at 2 (re-
counting that the report placed the blame for the scandal on “delegation of too much managerial re-
sponsibility to operating units like Tolstedt’s Community Bank”). The decentralized system at Wells 
Fargo meant that significant responsibility and oversight powers were pushed down to operating units. 
Jackson, supra note 155, at 2. The report explained that this allowed those in charge, like Tolstedt to 
prevent internal reports of issues from going up to the Board. Id. Still, scholars like Howell E. Jackson 
question why the Board did not investigate the risk that the decentralized system imposed on the com-
pany. Id. 
 174 BOARD INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 5, at 2 (noting that the investigative committee 
was created in late September of 2016, and showing the date of the report as April 10, 2017); Colvin, 
supra note 146, at 9. Employees will no longer be evaluated on how many products they sell to the 
customers and this information will no longer be reported to shareholders. Colvin, supra note 146, at 
9–10. 
 175 Colvin, supra note 146, at 10. The leaders of these units will now report to the corporate 
chiefs. Id. Sloan “consolidated much of the vast risk-control bureaucracy into a new office of ethics, 
oversight, and integrity, accountable to the Board’s risk committee.” Id. 
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scandal, in April of 2017, the same month as the report’s publication, Wells 
Fargo shareholders voted to re-elect all fifteen board members.176 
IV. WELLS FARGO AND OVERSIGHT LIABILITY MOVING FORWARD 
The director defendants of In re Wells Fargo & Company Shareholder 
Derivative Litigation filed a motion to dismiss the shareholder complaint for 
failing to plead demand futility.177 On May 4, 2017, the court denied the de-
fendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to the majority of the claims, includ-
ing the breach of fiduciary duties claim.178 The court focused on the collective 
presence of seven specific red flags and held that “they support[ed] an infer-
ence that a majority of director defendants consciously disregarded their fidu-
ciary duties despite knowledge regarding widespread illegal account-creation 
                                                                                                                           
 176 BOARD INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 5, at 2; Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo Shareholders 
Tepidly Re-elect Bank’s Directors, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/04/25/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-board.html [https://perma.cc/T6YL-JQQC] [hereinaf-
ter Cowley, Shareholders Tepidly Re-elect]. Some shareholders had the intention of removing at least 
some of the board members, but each board member had support from at least 53% of the shareholders, 
allowing re-election. Cowley, Shareholders Tepidly Re-elect, supra. In June of 2017, Senator Elizabeth 
Warren wrote a letter to Janet Yellen, Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
asking the Federal Reserve to remove twelve Wells Fargo board members who served on the bank’s 
Board during the scandal. Letter from Senator Elizabeth Warren to Janet Yellen, Chair, Fed. Reserve 
Bd. of Governors (June 19, 2017), https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2017-6-19_
Warren_Ltr_to_Fed.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V8T-XRZ2]. In 2018, the Federal Reserve took action and 
ordered Wells Fargo not to grow its assets beyond their current value ($1.95 trillion) and to replace 
four members of the Board. Mark Calvey & Riley McDermid, Wells Fargo Shares Plunge as Bank 
Hit by Fed with Growth Limit, Plans Removal of Four Directors, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2018), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2018/02/02/wells-fargo-bank-federal-reserve-
scandal-wfc.html [https://perma.cc/TTS9-HQMF]. Wells Fargo predicted that this halt on financial 
growth would cost the bank about $400 million in profits. Id. In a statement, Janet Yellen said: “We 
cannot tolerate pervasive and persistent misconduct at any bank and the consumers harmed by Wells 
Fargo requires the firm to improve its governance and risk management processes, including strength-
ening the effectiveness of oversight by its board of directors.” Id. 
 177 See generally Wells Fargo & Co.’s Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss, In re Wells Far-
go & Co., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (No. 3:16-cv-05541). The motion to dismiss was 
first filed by nominal defendant Wells Fargo, and the director defendants joined in the motion thereaf-
ter. In re Wells Fargo & Co. S’holder Derivative Litig., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1081 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 
2017). In order to be successful, plaintiffs must have proved that defendants had knowledge of illegal 
activity or that they were consciously disregarding their fiduciary duties, due to the exculpatory provi-
sion included in Wells Fargo’s certificate of incorporation. Id. at 1107. 
 178 See In re Wells Fargo & Co., 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1088 (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss 
because plaintiffs’ allegations created a substantial likelihood that defendants consciously disregarded 
their fiduciary duties and will be liable for breach of those duties). The court granted the motion to 
dismiss for the claim brought under section 25403 of the California Corporations Code, because the 
section does not provide a private right of action. Id. This decision would have allowed the case to 
progress and given plaintiffs the opportunity to prove their claims; however, a $240 million settlement 
was reached in February of 2019. Morgenson, supra note 17; Jonathan Stempel & Dena Aubin, Wells 
Fargo Officials Enter $240 Million Settlement Over Bogus Accounts, REUTERS (Mar. 1, 2019, 8:54 
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wells-fargo-settlement/wells-fargo-officials-enter-240-
million-settlement-over-bogus-accounts-idUSKCN1QI4P3 [https://perma.cc/C7JE-MLKC]. 
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activities, and therefore, that there is a substantial likelihood of director over-
sight liability,” satisfying the Caremark standard.179 This ruling sends a strong 
message to directors, that where they fail to act in the presence of knowledge 
of misconduct, the court might not rule in their favor, at least not at the motion 
to dismiss stage of the litigation.180 
It is rare for the courts to find director liability or likelihood of director li-
ability, and when they do, it is usually for cases that involve extraordinary cir-
cumstances.181 As demonstrated by the Wells Fargo scandal, directors need to 
experience consequences for their mistakes to deter future misconduct.182 Alt-
hough the Board took some action in 2016 to address the issue and regulators 
imposed some consequences on Wells Fargo, these responses appear inade-
                                                                                                                           
 179 In re Wells Fargo & Co., 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1088; see Karp, supra note 18 (explaining the 
court’s standard for oversight liability and its conclusion that the plaintiffs’ claims survived under the 
Caremark standard). The court specified the following seven red flags: (1) Stumpf’s testimony regard-
ing when he knew about the misconduct; (2) reports and other communications from employees to the 
Board alerting them about the misconduct; (3) various litigation against the company (4) the Los An-
geles Times article exposing Wells Fargo’s fraud; (5) other interventions by federal regulators; (6) the 
increase in employee terminations that occurred to silence the whistleblowers; and (7) the emphasis 
that Wells Fargo put on cross-selling and its importance to their financial reports. In re Wells Fargo & 
Co., 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1088. The court focused on the number of red flags and extent that they were 
directly communicated to the Board. Karp, supra note 18. The court acknowledged that standing alone, 
any one of these red flags may be insignificant, because of the large size of Wells Fargo. In re Wells 
Fargo & Co., 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1088. The court, however, looked at the facts collectively and not 
individually, and it concluded that the record supported the inference that defendant directors “con-
sciously disregarded” their fiduciary duties while having knowledge of misconduct. Id. 
 180 See Karp, supra note 18 (arguing that a court might not favor directors and rule that the direc-
tors “consciously disregarded” their duties when they fail to act in the presence of knowledge of mis-
conduct within the corporation). Securities-law expert Lewis D. Lowenfels commented on this court’s 
denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss: 
[This ruling] is a reminder that you can’t just be a passive figurehead on a board and 
keep your fingers crossed that nothing will go wrong . . . . You have to be actively in-
volved and cognizant of what’s going on with respect to the company, or you could 
very well face liabilities. 
See Morgenson, supra note 17 (quoting Lewis D. Lowenfels). 
 181 Karp, supra note 18; see In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 653 (Del. Ch. 2008) 
(stating that the Delaware Supreme Court has established that liability will be imposed only where 
there is a “strong showing of misconduct”); Nees, supra note 31, at 215–16 (explaining that oversight 
liability is rarely a threat to directors unless there is a clear violation of a law); Velasco, supra note 18, 
at 166–67 (acknowledging that liability will only be imposed for “more egregious breaches”). The fact 
that the court in In re Wells Fargo & Co. denied the motion to dismiss does not mean that future 
courts will do the same. Karp, supra note 18. It is possible that the allegations against Wells Fargo are 
so unique that the decision might be limited only to its uncommon set of facts. Id. 
 182 See Egan, Where Was the Board?, supra note 6 (quoting New York City Comptroller Scott 
Stringer who said: “This scandal was the result of a serious oversight failure by Wells Fargo’s board, 
and the directors responsible need to be held accountable”); see also Mark Thoma, Explainer: “What 
Is Moral Hazard”?, CBS NEWS (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/explainer-moral-
hazard [https://perma.cc/8XA5-PYKB] (arguing that, in order to decrease risk-taking and misconduct 
by directors, they need to be held liable and responsible for their actions). 
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quate to deter this kind of wrongdoing in the future because directors and of-
ficers were not sufficiently punished.183 The actions that the Board took were 
inadequate, even hollow, and the actions taken by regulators were severely 
criticized as insufficient, and there therefore needs to be more enforcement on 
the judicial end in order to deter misconduct.184 
The court’s rare decision in In re Wells Fargo & Co. Shareholder Deriva-
tive Litigation at the motion to dismiss stage is a step in the right direction in 
order to deter director failure of oversight, however plaintiffs must still carry a 
significant burden to prove their claims.185 Moreover, it is likely parties to such 
litigation will settle before trial, as has occurred in the Wells Fargo case, and 
settlement amounts are typically covered by director and officer (“D&O”) in-
surance.186 Because of significant director protections, the application of the 
                                                                                                                           
 183 See Michael Hiltzik, The Wells Fargo Board Is Still Getting a Pass for Failure, L.A. TIMES 
(Feb. 6, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-wells-fargo-20180206-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/9SML-LEHQ] (reporting that the former Secretary of the Department of the Treas-
ury, Lawrence Summers, believes that the Wells Fargo board of directors are “getting off too easy” for 
their role in the scandal); Thoma, supra note 182 (explaining that minimizing protections against 
liability and accountability will incentivize directors and other decision makers to decrease risk-taking 
and wrongdoing). 
 184 See COMPTROLLER REPORT, supra note 148, at 4 (finding that the OCC failed to act in a time-
ly and effective manner after receiving complaints regarding sales practice violations); Hiltzik, supra 
note 183 (asking why only four directors are being fired, and why Sloan, who had management re-
sponsibilities during the scandal, is not being fired as well); Lawrence H. Summers, Lawrence Sum-
mers: Wells Fargo’s Board Members Are Getting off Too Easy, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/02/06/lawrence-summers-wells-fargos-board-
members-are-getting-off-too-easy [https://perma.cc/53FV-HFPS] (asking why the four directors who 
are being fired are not being named, and why they are not being “asked to resign effective immediate-
ly with an element of humiliation”); Kurt Walters, Regulators Must Finish the Job of Penalizing Wells 
Fargo, AM. BANKER (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/regulators-must-
finish-the-job-of-penalizing-wells-fargo [https://perma.cc/C3DK-ZBLR] (pointing out that the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has not begun to investigate whether Wells Fargo deserves to 
keep its federal-deposit-insurance privilege even though the OCC found that it engaged in “unsafe and 
unsound practices”). The Board’s actions in response to the scandal appeared forced and mechanical, 
and the consequences appeared to be more of a simple slap on the wrist than serious punishment. See 
Cowley, Shareholders Tepidly Re-elect, supra note 176 (reporting that despite the scandal, all fifteen 
board members were re-elected by shareholders); Puzzanghera, supra note 167 (reporting that Sloan 
was appointed as CEO even though he admitted to being aware of the creation of illegal bank ac-
counts as early as 2013); Rolnick, supra note 171 (acknowledging that the Board’s investigation re-
port placed little, if any, blame on the directors for the scandal); Shen, supra note 166 (reporting that 
Stumpf will retire with a significant amount of money, even after the claw backs). 
 185 See Nees, supra note 31, at 215 (arguing that the prevalence of the exculpatory provision, the 
courts’ interpretations of the oversight liability doctrine and good faith, and the prominent presence of 
the business judgment rule present obstacles to plaintiff success in bringing oversight liability claims); 
Morgenson, supra note 17 (stating that the court’s unusual decision in In re Wells Fargo & Co. Share-
holder Derivative Litigation will hopefully send a clear message to directors that they must perform 
adequate oversight to avoid liability). 
 186 See ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 8, at 421–22 (explaining the incentives that both parties 
have to settle and the high likelihood of D&O insurance coverage on any possible settlement or litiga-
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oversight liability doctrine should be expanded in order to deny more motions 
to dismiss and send a message that courts will not tolerate director misconduct 
any longer.187 Section A analyzes the importance of finding director liability 
and deterring future misconduct.188 Section B provides possible ways for 
courts to expand the oversight liability doctrine.189 
A. The Importance of Expanding the Application of Oversight  
Liability to Deter Future Misconduct 
Narrow judicial application of oversight liability only provides directors 
with another shield against personal liability, on top of exculpatory provisions, 
the business judgment rule, indemnification, and D&O insurance.190 Such pro-
tections create moral hazard and the possibility of problematic excessive risk-
taking.191 These concerns are heightened when the corporation is a financial 
institution with additional government protections, such as Wells Fargo.192 The 
risk of failing to monitor internal controls or business risks of a financial insti-
                                                                                                                           
tion expenses); Stempel & Aubin, supra note 178 (reporting the $240 million settlement of the Wells 
Fargo litigation in February of 2019). 
 187 See Nees, supra note 31, at 215–16 (arguing that the current judicial approach to oversight 
liability is a “toothless tiger” and poses no threat to directors, warranting change); Karp, supra note 18 
(stating that denials of motions to dismiss in oversight liability claims threaten and remind directors 
that where they consciously disregard their duties, the court might not grant the motion). 
 188 See infra notes 190–199 and accompanying text. 
 189 See infra notes 200–217 and accompanying text. 
 190 See Nees, supra note 31, at 215–16 (arguing that the narrow interpretation of the oversight 
liability doctrine that is currently used poses minimal threat of director liability). 
 191 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Too Big to Fool: Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate Responsi-
bility, 102 MINN. L. REV. 761, 761 (2017) (defining the moral-hazard problem: when people are pro-
tected from liability or other negative consequences of their decisions they are inclined to take more 
risks, which could lead to excessive risk-taking); Thoma, supra note 182 (describing how protections 
against losses alter an individual’s behavior). It is important to note that shareholders want directors to 
take certain amounts of risks, because that is how they produce returns. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder 
Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 126 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 192 See Schwarcz, supra note 191, at 761–62 (stating that excessive risk-taking by financial insti-
tutions was allegedly the cause of the 2008 Financial Crisis and continues to be a threat to our econo-
my); Who Is the FDIC?, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/symbol [https://perma.cc/22QW-
7N7J] (explaining that the FDIC insures bank and thrift deposits of up to $250,000 per person, per 
account in case the bank fails and cannot meet deposit withdrawal demands). Certain financial institu-
tions are “too big to fail,” and will be subject to government bailouts in order to save the rest of the 
economy. Thoma, supra note 182. The government bears the loss of the mistakes of the financial 
institutions. Id. The government is willing to bail out “too big to fail” financial institutions because of 
systemic risk. James Bullard et al., Systemic Risk and the Financial Crisis: A Primer, FED. RES. BANK 
ST. LOUIS REV., Sept./Oct. 2009, 403, 403, https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publications/
review/09/09/part1/Bullard.pdf [https://perma.cc/CKJ5-YR5Z]. This protection incentivizes them to 
make riskier decisions and investments, which increases the chances of a bail out. Thoma, supra note 
182. 
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tution is especially dangerous because of the significant effect that failure of 
these institutions can have on the economy.193 
Systemic risk is the threat that failure of one institution will create a dom-
ino effect, causing financial distress within other institutions and jeopardizing 
the entire financial system.194 Failure of one financial institution significantly 
increases this risk.195 Corporate governance scandals, especially at the third 
largest financial institution in the United States, thus threaten the entire econ-
omy because of the financial distress caused by the scandals.196 Wells Fargo is 
a “too big to fail” bank that is incentivized to engage in increased risk-taking, 
and if it fails, it has the potential to cause another economic crisis.197 Because 
of the potential detrimental effects of these corporate scandals, courts should 
                                                                                                                           
 193 See Petrin, supra note 16, at 455–56 (explaining that due to current judicial interpretation, 
directors have a decreased incentive to properly exercise their oversight duty because only a “com-
plete” failure of oversight will result in liability); Robert Lenzner, The Ten Reasons Why There Will 
Be Another Systemic Financial Crisis, FORBES (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
robertlenzner/2014/12/08/the-ten-reasons-why-there-will-be-another-systemic-financial-crisis [https://
perma.cc/V2BS-TJ36] (opining that the next financial crisis will likely involve banks that are “too big 
to fail”). 
 194 See Systemic Risk, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/systemic-risk.asp 
[https://perma.cc/7HQF-49HT] (defining systemic risk as the threat than an event can trigger the 
downfall of the United States’ economy). 
 195 See Bullard et al., supra note 192, at 404 (arguing that it only takes the failure of one financial 
institution to threaten the entire financial system). There are three reasons why the failure of one fi-
nancial institution increases systemic risk. Id. at 408–09. First of all, the financial system is intercon-
nected. Id. at 408; see Lenzner, supra note 193 (describing the financial system as a “fragile and com-
plex network of financial relationships that has built into it a tendency for periodic disturbances that 
can produce ‘huge unanticipated changes,’ which at times spin out of control into a catastrophe as 
took place in 2008”). Both commercial and investment banks lend and trade to each other. Bullard et 
al., supra note 192, at 408. Second, financial institutions are highly leveraged, meaning that a signifi-
cant amount of their assets come from issuing debt rather than selling equity in the corporation. Id. at 
409. Third, the nature of the banking and financial business requires institutions to hold illiquid long-
term assets and liquid short-term debt. Id. This makes these institutions subject to bank runs, which 
occur when depositors “run” to the bank to withdraw their money in response to uncertainty. See id. 
(describing the effects of depositors suddenly withdrawing their money from the banks). These runs 
threaten to cause the insolvency of the financial institution and increases systemic risk. See id. (stating 
that mass deposit withdrawals threaten the liquidity of the institution). 
 196 See Ely Razin, What Effect Will the Wells Fargo Fake Accounts Have on the Bank’s Commer-
cial Lending?, FORBES (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/elyrazin/2016/10/27/what-
effect-will-the-wells-fargo-fake-accounts-scandal-have-on-the-banks-commercial-lending 
[https://perma.cc/R64H-2C6W] (estimating that Wells Fargo could lose about $99 billion in deposits 
and $4 billion in revenue after the scandal). Scandals such as this one cause customers to lose faith in 
their bank, leading to them pulling their deposits to ensure the safety of their money. See id. (citing a 
study that found that 14% of Wells Fargo customers have already decided to change banks and 30% 
are “actively exploring” other banks to switch to). 
 197 Joyce, supra note 1; see Schwarcz, supra note 191, at 761–62 (stating that “excessive risk-
taking . . . is regarded as a continuing threat that can misallocate resources, increase public costs by 
necessitating government bailouts, and even cause other economic collapse”); Lenzner, supra note 
193 (predicting that the next economic crisis will involve banks that are “too big to fail”); Thoma, 
supra note 182 (explaining that “too big to fail” institutions will likely receive government bail outs in 
case of failure, which increases moral hazard and incentives to take risks, threatening the economy). 
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be more lenient with their application of the oversight liability doctrine, at least 
at the motion to dismiss stage, to increase the chance of director liability and 
minimize excessive risk-taking.198 Within both financial and non-financial in-
stitutions, an increase in the ability to find liability for failure to oversee inter-
nal controls or business risk can act as a check on the moral hazard created by 
all of these protections.199 
B. Reforms to Oversight Liability Doctrine 
The application of oversight liability could be expanded in a few ways to 
allow more cases to progress beyond the motion to dismiss stage of litigation 
and achieve a higher probability of imposing liability.200 First, plaintiffs should 
be allowed to plead breach of the duty of care in order to overcome the busi-
ness judgment rule at the procedural motion to dismiss stage, regardless of 
whether defendants have the protections of an exculpatory clause as permitted 
by DGCL section 102(b)(7).201 Continuing to apply exculpatory clauses at 
such early stages of litigation eliminates an avenue for plaintiffs to show direc-
tor liability.202 If allowed to argue the easier standard of breach of duty of care 
at the motion to dismiss stage, plaintiffs would have a better chance of advanc-
                                                                                                                           
 198 See Thoma, supra note 182 (stating that the way to decrease moral hazard is to hold decision 
makers responsible for their actions or inactions and to make them suffer the consequences of their 
decisions). With all the protections in place for directors and officers, there are minimal incentives to 
be cautious with investment and really oversee risk. See id. (stating that government bail outs do not 
incentivize a decrease in excessive risk-taking). 
 199 See id. (acknowledging that making directors deal with the consequences of their decisions 
will minimize the moral hazard created by multiple protections against liability). 
 200 See infra notes 201–217 and accompanying text. 
 201 See Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 935 (Del. Ch. 2007) (explaining that Stone rein-
forced the knowledge requirement and its application to oversight claims, and by doing this, the court 
ensured protection of the exculpatory provision for breach of the duty of care even at the motion to 
dismiss stage of litigation); see, e.g., In re Lear Corp., 967 A.2d at 647–48 (providing an example 
where plaintiffs could not argue breach of the duty of care at the motion to dismiss stage in order to 
overcome the business judgment presumption because of the presence of an exculpatory provision); 
see also Nees, supra note 31, at 225, 228 (explaining that the procedural timing of the business judg-
ment rule at the motion-to-dismiss stage requires plaintiffs to plead specific facts, which is extremely 
difficult to accomplish due to the unavailability of extensive fact finding at that stage in the litigation). 
 202 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2018) (allowing corporations to write exculpatory 
provisions in their certificates of incorporation, eliminating liability for breach of the duty of care); 
Desimone, 924 A.2d at 908, 935 (clarifying that exculpatory provisions protect directors at the motion 
to dismiss stage of the litigation); see also Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 141 (Del. 2008) (stating that 
when directors are exculpated from liability for certain conduct, liability is only a significant threat if 
plaintiffs plead a claim that is not exculpated in the certificate of incorporation) (quoting Guttman v. 
Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 501 (Del. Ch. 2003)); Nees, supra note 31, at 219 (explaining that this exculpa-
tory provision eliminates liability for gross negligence and leaves the plaintiff to rely on showing 
breach of the duty of loyalty or good faith); see, e.g., Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 239 
(Del. 2009) (forcing plaintiffs to solely plead breach of the duty of loyalty due to the bar on breach of 
the duty of care claims created by the exculpatory provision in the company’s certificate of incorpora-
tion). 
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ing through this stage and would have more time and resources to gather all 
facts needed in order to prove breach of loyalty and good faith when the court 
hears the case on the merits.203 An alternative suggestion would be to prohibit 
defendants from filing a motion to dismiss until after discovery and adequate 
fact-finding, to allow plaintiffs to gather sufficient facts to effectively prove 
their claim.204 
Second, the oversight doctrine could be expanded by widening the criteria 
to find “bad faith” stated in Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, which allow a find-
ing of bad faith only if directors have knowledge of their required duties and 
completely fail to execute them.205 Under the current interpretation, minimal 
effort by directors to fulfill duties will satisfy the standard of good faith because 
such effort does not constitute complete failure.206 The requirement of complete 
failure could be widened to significant, considerable, or notable failure.207 
Another possible expansion of oversight liability would be to separate 
breach of the duty of loyalty from the requirement for bad faith.208 For corpo-
rations that have eliminated liability for breach of the duty of care in their cer-
tificate of incorporation, the current application disallows a finding of liability 
without a finding of bad faith.209 Separation would facilitate the finding of lia-
                                                                                                                           
 203 See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996) (acknowl-
edging that the available claim, breach of the duty of loyalty, is a high standard to meet); Nees, supra 
note 31, at 228 (explaining that the business judgment standard may lead to dismissal of the case be-
fore plaintiffs access necessary discovery to prove a breach of the duty of loyalty); see also In re 
Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 125 (admitting that the burden on the plaintiff to prove bad faith is greater than 
the burden to prove gross negligence). 
 204 See Nees, supra note 31, at 228 (explaining how the business judgment rule at the motion-to-
dismiss stage requires plaintiffs to plead specific facts, but noting that pleading specific facts to show 
breach of the duty of loyalty is extremely difficult without extensive fact-finding, which is available in 
discovery); see, e.g., In re Lear Corp., 967 A.2d at 647–48 (holding that plaintiffs did not plead suffi-
cient specific facts to prove that defendants breached their duty of loyalty and dismissing the claim). 
 205 970 A.2d at 243–44. 
 206 See Petrin, supra note 16, at 455–56 (interpreting Lyondell Chemical and acknowledging that 
any reasonable effort, even a minimal one, to oversee would be enough to satisfy the director’s obliga-
tions under the fiduciary duties). 
 207 See Lyondell Chem., 970 A.2d at 243–44 (concluding that liability could only be imposed where 
directors “knowingly and completely failed” in carrying out their duties, which had not occurred in that 
case). 
 208 See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (establishing that good faith is a subset of 
the duty of loyalty and that breach of good faith alone cannot result in liability directly, only indirect-
ly); Nees, supra note 31, at 224 (arguing that the collapse of the duty of good faith into the duty of 
loyalty narrows the ability for plaintiffs to prove liability and makes oversight liability a “toothless 
tiger”). 
 209 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7); see Wood, 953 A.2d at 141 (stating that when directors are 
exculpated from liability for certain conduct, liability is only possible if the plaintiffs plead a claim 
that is not or cannot be exculpated in the certificate of incorporation, such as breach of the duty of 
loyalty); Stone, 911 A.2d at 369–70 (confirming the Caremark standard that finding breach of the 
duty of good faith is a requirement for imposing liability for breach of the duty of loyalty); In re 
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971 (establishing that a finding of bad faith is required to find directors liable 
under a Caremark claim). 
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bility under breach of the duty of loyalty by eliminating the requirement to 
show knowledge of and conscious disregard of duties, as is necessary to show 
bad faith.210 Additionally, separation would add another avenue for bringing a 
claim by re-establishing good faith as an independent duty.211 
Expanding application of Caremark oversight claims to encompass fail-
ures to evaluate business risk is another way to discourage director misconduct 
by expanding liability.212 The Delaware court rejected such an expansion in In 
re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, relying on the policy of 
preventing the courts from second-guessing director decisions.213 Applying 
oversight liability to the evaluation of business risk would make directors more 
cautious in their investments and decisions in order to avoid significant losses 
to the corporation.214 
Lastly, in cases where there is no exculpatory provision and oversight lia-
bility is able to be brought under breach of the duty of care, a way to expand 
the application of liability would be to close the gap between the standard of 
conduct and the standard of review.215 The standard of review should be low-
                                                                                                                           
 210 See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (explaining that failure to act in good faith, a condition of finding 
liability under breach of the duty of loyalty, is proven by showing that directors consciously disre-
garded their responsibilities and that they had knowledge that they were disregarding their duties); see 
also In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 125 (acknowledging that proving bad faith places a very high burden 
on the plaintiff). 
 211 See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (establishing that the duty of good faith is not an independent duty 
and can only lead to liability indirectly). 
 212 See In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 125, 140 (affirming that the business judgment rule, DGCL 
section 102(b)(7), and the difficulty of being successful on a Caremark claim work together to place 
an “extremely high burden on a plaintiff to state a claim for personal director liability for a failure to 
see the extent of a company’s business risk,” and dismissing the Caremark claim that was brought for 
failure to oversee business risk); see also Thoma, supra note 182 (explaining that one way to decrease 
excessive risk-taking is to hold the risk takers liable and responsible for the consequences of their 
investments). 
 213 In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 126, 131 (concluding that allowing oversight liability for failure 
to monitor and evaluate excessive risk would allow the courts to make a “hindsight evaluation” of the 
decisions directors make, contradictory to the business judgment rule and “bedrock principles of Del-
aware fiduciary duty law”). 
 214 See Thoma, supra note 182 (explaining that one way to decrease excessive risk-taking is to 
hold the risk takers liable for the consequences of their investments); see also In re Citigroup, 964 
A.2d at 126 (stating that the court did not want to “cripple [director’s] ability to earn returns for inves-
tors by taking business risks”); Schwarcz, supra note 191 (stating that protections from liability create 
moral hazard). 
 215 See Velasco, supra note 18, at 167 (explaining that the standard of conduct that directors are 
held to is ordinary care and negligence while the standard of review is gross negligence); see also 
Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys. v. Corbat, No. CV 12151-VCG, 2017 WL 6452240, at *2 (Del. 
Ch. Dec. 18, 2017) (clarifying that, absent an exculpatory provision, an oversight claim can be 
brought as a breach of the duty of care); Nees, supra note 31, at 220 n.87 (questioning whether there 
should be an emphasis on closing the gap between the standard of conduct and the standard of review 
for the duty of care in order to prevent second-guessing by the courts). 
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ered to a negligence standard to match the standard of conduct.216 This would 
make directors who negligently failed to create a system of internal controls or 
negligently ignored red flags liable for breach of the duty of oversight.217 
CONCLUSION 
As this Note explains, it is important for courts to send a strong message 
to directors that, if they fail in their fiduciary duties, they will potentially be 
held liable. Directors have significant and numerous protections already in 
place for them. These protections increase moral hazard and incentivize exces-
sive risk-taking (or risky inaction). The court’s decision to deny the defendant 
directors’ motion to dismiss in In re Wells Fargo & Co. Shareholder Derivative 
Litigation is a step in the right direction, alerting directors that such miscon-
duct is unacceptable. Subsequent courts should expand the application of over-
sight liability, at least at the motion to dismiss stage, to instill the slightest bit 
of fear in directors and deter them from engaging in wrongdoing that will 
cause significant harm to their corporation. 
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 216 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (affirming that the standard for liability 
under the duty of care is gross negligence); Velasco, supra note 18, at 167 (explaining that although 
the standard of conduct for directors is a negligence standard, the courts will only find liability for 
breach of the duty of care if there is proof of gross negligence). Directors will be held liable if they act 
with “reckless indifference” toward the best interest of the corporation after being put on notice of possi-
ble illegal acts or other wrongdoings. Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys., 2017 WL 6452240, at *2. 
 217 See Aronson, 437 A.2d at 812 (stating that directors will be liable under the duty of care if 
they acted with gross negligence, rather than negligence); see also Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (explaining 
that liability is found when directors completely failed to implement a monitoring system or when, 
with such a system in place, directors ignored red flags that put them on notice of possible risks or 
problems). 
